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ABSTRACT

Durkheim's and Weber's perspectives on action and order are compared
by adding the concept of role to Kreps' theory of organization and
disaster.
Kreps defines organization as the co-presence of 4 individually
necessary elements— domains (D), tasks (T), resources (R), and activities
(A).
His resulting taxonomy of forms of association includes 24 possible
combinations of all 4 elements (D-T-R-A to A-R-T-D).
The taxonomy
represents the paradox of social structure as either a problem of action
or a problem of order.
When order is referenced, the paradox is expressed
well by Durkheim and the idea of role-making.
When action is referenced,
the paradox is stated nicely by Weber and the idea of role-playing.
The
dynamics of role-making and role-playing at the origins of organization,
then, reveals social structure as both Weberian social creation and
Durkheimian f o r c e .
Kreps depicts the unity of action and order in a normally distributed
metric of the the 24 organizational forms in the taxonomy.
The six
midpoint forms in the metric (D-A-R-T, T-R-A-D, T-A-D-R, R-D-A-T, R-T-D-A,
A-D-T-R) point to a tension or balancing of the forces of order and
action.
Detailed analyses of role-making and role-playing for these
midpoint forms are the focus of this research (38 cases of an original
sample of 423 instances of organization from 15 disaster events).
Four
criteria are developed to distinguish between role-making, mix role-making
and role-playing, and role-playing at each stage of the origins of
organization (1, 2, 3, and 4 elements present).
Marginal distributions of
role variables point to an expected increase m role-playing as each
additional element of organization is enacted.
However, the progressive
character of role-playing is grounded, in no small way, by emergent
improvisations.
These improvisations are indicative of role-making.
Role
dynamics are analyzed on their own terms and also as they relate to
physical, social, and temporal characteristics of the response and
emergency.
Correlation and regression analyses indicate that role-making
and role-playing must be seen as parts of a broader structural drama.
The
structural drama of disaster informs even as it is anticipated by the
respective theories of Durkheim and Weber.

DISASTER, ACTION, AND ORDER
A SUBSTANTIVE INQUIRY OF WEBER AND DURKHEIM

INTRODUCTION:

A DIALECTICAL APPROACH TO STRUCTURE

The conceptual focus of sociology suggests a basic dualism.
Sometimes primary attention is given to the human actor as prime mover of
social structure.

At other times the emphasis is on some notion of an

external structure— one which is real, apart from the actor, and
constrains his behavior.

Whether seen as forever becoming or always

there, social structure therefore exists for every sociological analyst as
the subject matter of the discipline.
not necessarily to know what it is.

To assume existence of something is
In the end, sociology is to social

structure as physics is to physical structure.
subject matter is, to some extent, a mystery.

For both disciplines the
As implied above, the

creation and maintenance of social structure are seldom discussed within
the same substantive theory.

For example, Blau's (1974;

1977) theory of

the division of labor presents structure as emergent force which maintains
collective life.

This contrasts with Cicourel's (1968;

1974) theory of

juvenile justice which casts structure as an interpretive and
intersubjective creation.

There is a contradiction here and Kreps (1985)

refers to it as the autonomy and unity of action and order.

That

contradiction, expressed as a problem of describing and explaining
organization in the disaster context, is the focus of the following
thesis.
Specifically the thesis builds on Kreps' theory of organization as
unit and as process.
human association.

For him structure is represented by the forms of
He attempts to define these forms and locate them in

the empirical setting of disaster.

The following example illustrates the

descriptive emphasis from which Kreps develops this theory.
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Notice his
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processual approach as he describes the origins of what he terms an
instance of organization.

As defined by Kreps. activities (A), human and

material resources (R), tasks (T), and domains (D) represent four basic
structural elements of organization.

Serving as a kind of core species

concept of organization (McKelvey, 1982), the four elements are seen as
individually necessary and collectively sufficient for organization to
exist.

This means that (1) each element is a unique expression of social

structure, (2) their co-presence establishes the existence of
organization, and (3) no pattern in their arrangement is necessarily more
frequent or important.

The elements are denoted for easy reference by the

parenthetical letters (A, R, T, D).

Their patternings in organizing

processes are the foundation of Kreps' theory and its expansion in this
thesis.

An organization of search and rescue emerges following an
earthquake. The event takes place without forewarning, is
regional in scope, destructive in magnitude, and its prompt and
secondary physical impacts are over within minutes to several
hours. The central business district and a large residential
area of a major city are seriously damaged. Immediately
following impact many individuals who happen to be in or near
these areas engage in joint actions related to search and rescue
of victims (A). A few of these early responders have search and
rescue training. Within an hour many search and rescue teams
converge on the impacted areas. Both formal and informal, they
come from city agencies, other municipalities, the military, and
several voluntary search and rescue groups (R). A task
structure emerges among some of these disparate groups within
several hours after impact, with prominent roles played by
members of a mountain rescue group and members of an emergent
"damage control" group (T). The legitimacy of an integrated
search and rescue operation is not officially recognized by city
government officials until about 12 hours after impact (D). By
then it is operating, now formally, out of the city's public
safety building. Formal search and rescue actions continue for
another 24-30 hours.
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The example suggests an instance of organization that was initiated by
activities (A), followed by the mobilization of key resources (A-R), which
led to the development of a set of tasks (A-R-T), and finally to the
establishment of a formal domain that was officially recognized and
legitimated within the impacted community (A-R-T-D).

The response

exemplifies an elemental patterning of the origins of organization,
defined below as an A-R-T-D form of association.

Because things are

happening before there are collective representations of what is going on,
the origins of organization appear as action-driven.
hypothetical patterns seem equally plausible.

However, alternative

If, for example, a domain

had been declared (D) and tasks socially defined (D-T) prior to the
mobilization of resources (D-T-R) and performance of activities (D-T-R-A),
the search and rescue effort would appear as order-driven.

In other

words, collective representations would constrain social action under
these circumstances.

The following example of evacuation during a flood

illustrates a form of origins that is considered by Kreps as order driven.

D-T-R-A
Evacuation of a potential flood plain is enacted by a fire
department prior to impact. A river runs through a large
metropolitan area. A state police unit wires the city fire
department with information that the river is at flood level,
that flood waters are causing considerable damage upstream, and
that flood conditions are expected to reach the city within
several hours. A fire department communications operator
contacts the fire chief who then puts the fire department on
standby alert. The fire department is schooled in evacuation
procedures through pre-disaster preparedness activities. After
being notified by the operator, the fire chief goes to the site
of the initial city police command post and informs police
personnel of his intention to evacuate low lying manufacturing
and residential areas of the city. Following this discussion
there is agreement that the fire department will handle the
evacuation of selected low lying areas (D). Upon receiving
additional information from the local police and water

5

departments, the chief decides to divide the fire department's
equipment and personnel into two sections, one on each side of
the river, to ensure an adequate distribution of resources for
both evacuation and fire protection. Working through the normal
chain of command, he orders fire personnel to mobilize and
relocate people and possessions below 1000 feet from the bank on
each side of the river (T). Fire department personnel and
equipment are then deployed according to the chief's dictates
(R). While the threatened population already has been warned of
flooding via the mass media, fire department personnel move door
to door in order to evacuate all residents in the selected
lowland areas. There is sufficient time prior to flooding to
both evacuate those threatened and recheck the areas covered.
Several threatened individuals choose to remain anyway, arguing
that they must protect or secure their property. Some of those
who remain are stranded. The evacuation of those stranded by
high water is then accomplished by using fire department boats.
As conditions become more severe, larger boats are requested by
the fire department and several are volunteered. The evacuation
is terminated shortly after impact when all those stranded have
been successfully evacuated (A). In the face of considerable
property damage, there are no deaths or serious injuries
resulting from the flood.

Kreps conceives the range of forms of organization implied by these
two examples as a continuum:

with D-T-R-A or social order at one end and

A-R-T-D or social action at the other end.

Domains (D) legitimate what is

taking place and tasks (T) collectively represent how it is being done
(Durkheim, 1938).
organization.

Kreps interprets them as the structural ends of

Resources (R) are human attributes and material

technologies and activities (A) are the joint actions of individuals and
social units.

Kreps interprets these latter two elements as the

structural means of organization.

He argues that each of the four

elements is independent of the others, thus they all relate equally to
organization as entity or thing.

Their sequential patterning in time and

space reveals organization as process.

From archival data on 15 disaster

events, Kreps has constructed thus far a data file of 423 instances of
organization which fall at various points on a continuum of social order

6

(D-T-R-A) to social action (A-R-T-D).
of these 423 cases.

Table 1 summarizes the distribution

Note that some 39 cases fall at what looks like the

midpoint of the continuum.

Here it appears that no simple judgment can be

made as to whether the six forms so located are either action-driven or
order-driven.

The following example describes one of these six types.

T-R-A-D
Material resources are mobilized by residents of one
community and provided to the victims of another. An entire
region is impacted by a major earthquake. Although several
communities suffer serious damage, some are spared.
Considerable concern is expressed by residents and leaders of
one unimpacted city about the adequacy of assistance being
provided to a small and isolated town that was devastated by
tsunami that followed the earthquake. A joint meeting involving
representatives from the unimpacted city's chamber of commerce,
city government, and the trucking industry takes place on the
fourth day following the event. A chairman is appointed and
food, communications, and transportation committees are set up
(T). At least 50 people are mobilized (R) for the collection of
food and other commodities in the unimpacted city. A core group
consisting of the unimpacted city's public works director,
engineer, and building inspector, as well as a privately
employed architectural engineer then transport the supplies to
the impacted town which is some distance away (A). Leaders and
residents of the devastated town have no knowledge of this
assistance until it arrives on site. The core group meets with
some members of the impacted community's town council and offers
the assistance. The following day the town council meets and
asks the core group to take over the distribution of its own
resources as well as perform other community functions (D).

This third example of origins involves the development of a division
of labor (T), followed by the mobilization of resources (T-R) and the
performance of joint actions relative to that division of labor (T-R-A),
and culminated by the legitimation of the domain of action by officials of
the devastated town (D).

Unlike the first two cases, neither ends nor

means predominate at the origins of organization.

Notice how domains and

TABLE 1:

Organizational Forms:

Organizational
Forms

Total Sample

Number of Units:
Total Sample

D-T-R-A

167

(167)

D-T-A-R
D-R-T-A
T-D-R-A

5
53
1

(59)

D-R-A-T
D-A-T-R
T-R-D-A
T-D-A-R
R-D-T-A

27
2
4
67

(100)

D-A-R-T
T-R-A-D
T-A-D-R
R-D-A-T
R-T-D-A
A-D-T-R

1
21
12
4
1

T-A-R-D
R-A-D-T
R-T-A-D
A-D-R-T
A-T-D-R

15
13
1
2

(31)

R-A-T-D
A-T-R-D
A-R-D-T

13
4
5

(22)

A-R-T-D

5

(5)

423

(423)

Totals

(39)
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tasks independently express the entity quality of organization.

Notice

also the discontinuity between tasks and domain, yet the continuity of
both with pre-disaster routines.

The process described cannot readily be

interpreted as either order- or action-driven.
In his work Kreps (1985) addresses taxonomic problems of description.
The above case studies illustrate the importance of elemental attempts to
create organization.

Logically, the patterning of all combinations of 1-4

of these elements yields a taxonomy of 64 forms of association (see Table
2).

Only the 4-element forms (D-T-R-A to A-R-T-D) are collectively

sufficient for organiztion to exist (24 organizational forms of
association).

Thus Kreps' taxonomy distinguishes between organization

(24) and other (40) forms of association.
Kreps expresses the continuum of social order and social action by
the metric found on Tables 3 and 4.

Critical for his analysis, even

though most (all but 52) of the 423 instances of organization found were
enacted by established units of various types (i.e., they existed before
the disaster event) existence is not assumed for purposes of studying the
process of organization.

In effect, the event serves as a social catalyst

for studying the origins of organization and the rationale is similar to
that used in chemistry (Dubin, 1978).

For Kreps, the life history of

organization is circumscribed by the event and its aftermath.

Within this

time frame, many existing social units do not act at all or do different
things.

Thus, neither involvement nor its precise character can be

assumed for these non-routine events.

Note, however, that by invoking the

event as social catalyst, Kreps does not deny the relevance of pre-event
conditions for what takes place.
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TABLE 2:

Taxonomy of Forms of Association*

Organizational
Forms

Three
Element
Forms

Two
Element
Forms

One
Element
Forms

D-T-R-A
D-T-A-R
D-R-A-T
D-R-T-A
D-A-T-R
D-A-R-T
T-R-A-D
T-R-D-A
T-A-D-R
T-A-R-D
T-D-R-A
T-D-A-R
R-A-D-T
R-A-T-D
R-D-T-A
R-D-A-T
R-T-D-A
R-T-A-D
A-D-T-R
A-D-R-T
A-T-D-R
A-T-R-D
A-R-D-T
A-R-T-D

D-T-R
D-T-A
D-R-A
D-R-T
D-A-T
D-A-R
T-R-A
T-R-D
T-A-D
T-A-R
T-D-R
T-D-A
R-A-D
R-A-T
R-D-T
R-D-A
R-T-D
R-T-A
A-D-T
A-D-R
A-T-D
A-T-R
A-R-D
A-R-T

D-T
D-R
D-A
T-R
T-A
T-D
R-A
R-D
R-T
A-D
A-T
A-R

D
T
R
A

*From Kreps (1984b)
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TABLE 3:

Organizational Forms: Total Sample
Social Order - Social Action Metric

Organizational
Forms

Logical
Metric

Number of
Forms

D-T-R-A

+3

(1)

167

(167)

D-T-A-R
D-R-T-A
T-D-R-A

+2

(3)

5
53
1

(59)

D-R-A-T
D-A-T-R
T-R-D-A
T-D-A-R
R-D-T-A

D-A-R-T
T-R-A-D
T-A-D-R
R-D-A-T
R-T-D-A
A-D-T-R

+1

(5)

Number of Units:
Total Sample

27
2
4

(100)

67

0

(6)

T-A-R-D
R-A-D-T
R-T-A-D
A-D-R-T
A-T-D-R

-1

(5)

R-A-T-D
A-T-R-D
A-R-D-T

-2

(3)

A-R-T-D

-3

(1)__

Totals

(24)

1
21
12
4
1

(39)

15
13
1
2

(31)

13
4
5

(22)

5

423

(5)

(423)
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TABLE 4:

Organizational
Forms

Organizational Forms: Emergent Units
Social Order - Social Action Metric

Logical
Metric

Number of
Forms

Number of Units:
Emergent

D-T-R-A

6

(+3)

(1)

3

(3)

D-T-A-R
D-R-T-A
T-D-R-A

5

(+2)

(3)

6

(6)

(5)

4
1
14

(19)

D-R-A-T
D-A-T-R
T-R-D-A
T-D-A-R
R-D-T-A

D-A-R-T
T-R-A-D
T-A-D-R
R-D-A-T
R-T-D-A
A-D-T-R

4

(+ 1)

-

3
3

(0)

(6)

(11)

-

7
1
-

T-A-R-D
R-A-D-T
R-T-A-D
A-D-R-T
A-T-D-R

2

(-1)

(5)

R-A-T-D
A-T-R-D
A-R-D-T

1

(-2)

(3)

3
1
3

(7)

A-R-T-D

0

(-3)

(1)

3

(3)

Totals

(24)

2
1

(3)

(32)
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The 24 organizational forms of association are arrayed on Tables 3
and 4 with values ranging from 6 or +3 to 0 or -3.

The key requirement

for constructing the metric is to capture all of the differences between
D-T-R-A or social order and A-R-T-D or social action.
the following way:
T, R, and A (3);

This can be done in

At the social order end of the continuum, D precedes
T precedes R and A (2);

and R precedes A (1).

Given

one point for each conforming transitivity (3+2+1), D-T-R-A receives a
score of six;

while at the social action end of the continuum, A-R-T-D

receives a score of zero.

This scoring technique points to the importance

of a processual view of organization in which transitivities reflect the
sequential ordering of elements.

Beginning at the social action end would

simply reverse the scores, but not change the distribution in any way.
Thus D-R-T-A, for example, receives a score of five when starting from
social order and one when starting from social action.
social ends predicate social means.
case.

With D-T-R-A,

With A-R-T-D, the obverse is the

The 22 forms between D-T-R-A and A-R-T-D, and the remaining 1-3

element forms subsumed by them, suggest varying degrees of continuity and
discontinuity between the ends and means of collective life.
Notice again on Tables 3 and 4 that six of the twenty-four
organizational forms fall at the midpoint of the metric.

As illustrated

in the third example above, these forms are neither order- nor
action-driven.

Their scores are the same regardless of whether the

referent is social order or social action.
above T-R-A-D example receives a score of 3:

A midpoint form such as the
from the social order end of

the continuum because T precedes R (1 point), T precedes A (1 point), and
R precedes A (1 point);

and from the social action end of the continuum

because A precedes D (1 point), R precedes D (1 point), and T precedes D

13

(1 point).

The score is 3 because no other transitivity is consistent

with ’’perfect*' social order or "perfect" social action.

By subtracting a

constant 3 from each derived level of social order or social action, the
resulting metrics
Going beyond

are +3 to -3 with a 0 midpoint.
Kreps' descriptions of the six midpoint forms, the

thesis addresses the problem of unraveling the tension or balance of
action and order revealed by these forms.

My approach is substantive and

uses disaster research to exploit insights about structure from Weber and
Durkheim.

The central concept in the analysis is role.

Before

proceeding, however, let us consider current sociological approaches to
action, order, and structure.
Substantive theories reveal a strain toward either social action or
social order.

Social action is grounded in the subjective states and

behaviors of human beings.

Social order is grounded in the collective

representations and normative force of social units (Alexander, 1982a;
Giddens, 1982).

The resulting issue at the metatheoretical level has

traditionally been one of trying to reconcile action and order
perspectives.

More specifically, under the continuing influence of the

classics, some metatheorists (e.g., Parsons, 1938;
1979;

Alexander,

synthesize action

1982a;

1982b;

1950;

Giddens, 1976;

1983;1984) make pointed attempts

and order perspectives.

to

While abstract as opposed to

empirical, these attempts illuminate two important clues for substantive
work.

First, both action (and the actor) and order (and the unit) must be

implicated in defining social structure as what is to be explained in
sociology.

Second, the conception of structure must be dialectical.

the action side, the knowledgeable and capable actor must be seen as
subject of inquiry who creates structure.

At the same time, the actor

From
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must be seen as passive object of external units that are equally real.
From the order side, structure must be viewed as fixed thing which
maintains collective life.

At the same time, it must be viewed as in a

constant state of change as the result of the actions of human beings.

To

define structure only in terms of creating collective life is to be
psychologically reductionist, while focusing only on how it is maintained
results in sociological reductionism.

Either path provides an incomplete

definition and description of structure as basic subject matter.
Because metatheorists are oriented to defining the subject matter at
an abstract level, they are less inclined to develop procedural rules for
locating it.

This indifference to substantive inquiry points to a

critical distinction between thinking sociology and doing research.
former without the latter has resulted in a flawed exercise.

The

Rather than

exploit the dialectic to describe structure empirically, the effort has
been to achieve a Hegelian synthesis.
two reasons.
precluded.

The attempted synthesis fails for

First, a dialectical definition of social structure is
With the synthetic approach, you define action and derive

order or vice versa.

The result is the collapsing of definition and

explanation of structure (Wallace, 1983).

As Kreps points out, what is

needed is a dialectical definition of structure that leads to description
but not explanation.

Second, the quest for synthesis denies the

uniqueness of action and order perspectives as possible avenues of
explaining social structure as it may be dialectically defined and
described.

Thus, substantive theorists are quite right when they choose

action or order perspectives to explain social structure.

But what they

need, and do not have, is a dialectical description of what they are
trying to explain.
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The general requirement for those engaged in substantive research is
to give more attention to defining and describing social structure as core
subject matter of sociology.

Heretofore, avoiding the trap of

metatheoretical synthesis has been accidental rather than intentional.
The twin difficulty can be simply stated:

there is an inadequate

definition of the subject matter at the metatheoretical level that is
matched by an equally weak description of structure in substantive
research.

Perhaps this is why sociology is characterized more by

dissensus than consensus with regard to paradigms, theories, and methods.
The lack of consensus has fueled unproductive debates for too long.
Concerned with the current state of the discipline, I will focus
initially on defining the puzzle— relying on the classical works of
Durkheim and Weber to do so.

Second, as outlined in the contemporary

research of Kreps (1985), structure will be described dialectically within
the context of disaster.

Once again, the contributions of Durkheim and

Weber are fundamental as I build on Kreps' earlier work.

In the end,

Kreps' and my studies of social response to disaster serve as the basis
for a substantive comparison of Durkheim and Weber.
As outlined in the classical writings of Durkheim and Weber,
attention to defining the subject matter is as important as attempting to
explain it.

In their classical works each implies that the subject matter

of sociology— collective life— requires multidimensional expression, yet
demands unidimensional explanation through substantive research
(Alexander, 1982a).

That is, they defined what is to be explained in

terms of both the knowledgeable actor who creates and recreates structure
(action), and the external unit through which structure is maintained
(order), yet they tried to explain this common subject matter from
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different perspectives.

Weber focused on action, while Durkheim focused

on order in the attempt to explain structure.

Although both were

self-defined substantive sociologists, each reacted metatheoretically in
their observation of actors and social units.

Their classical works

illustrate the necessity of being unidimensional and multidimensional
about structure.

The result is an uncovering of structure as the

dialectic of action and order.

A CLASSICAL APPROACH TO A CONTEMPORARY PROBLEM:
DEFINING THE PUZZLE

In defining the
to what it is we are

discipline sociologists must come to a consensus as
trying to explain:

Are we trying to determine how

collective life is created or how it is maintained?
subject of inquiry or the object of inquiry?
process?

Is the actor the

Is structure a unit or a

Durkheim and Weber answer both to all of these questions.

actor is subject and

object;

structure is static and dynamic;

The

and

sociologists can address action and order at the same time through
dialectical reasoning.
The above issues have become a major source of division among
contemporary sociologists.

The subject matter is defined in terms of

either social action or social order— according to Alexander
(1982a)— because of one-sided presuppositions about the nature of
structure.

At the ontological level the distinction is expressed by the

debate between nominalism and realism (Warriner, 1956;

Wallace, 1983).

At the epistemological level, however, the question is not what is real,
rather it is how do we apprehend whatever '*it‘‘ is.
and maintenance of structure related?

How are the creation

In what manner is the dialectic of

action and order revealed by structure?

The empirical requirements of

science seem to demand that we choose either actor or unit as the object
of inquiry.

But how can we do that and still retain a dialectical (or in

Alexander's terms multidimensional) perspective on structure?
end, is it possible to capture substantively what are obvious
contradictions?
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How, in the

18

Weber and Durkheim introduced action and order, and their
contradictory relationship in structure, as the unique domain of
sociology.

In comparing Durkheim and his order orientation with Weber and

his emphasis on action, it is possible to begin to appreciate the
magnitude of their sociological contributions and the importance of
addressing the dialectic of structure from, respectively, order and action
sides.

First, a review of DurkheinTs order orientation will illustrate

how, through substantive studies, he defined the puzzle of structure in
terms of a paradoxical relationship between order and action, expressed as
a problem of order.

Weber recognized the same dialectic, but approached

it from the action side.

A closer look at his work reveals the care he

took in attempting to capture the dialectic in his description of the unit
of sociological analysis.
Durkheim: An Order Orientation
Throughout his work Durkheim points to contradictions.

He explicitly

defines the social order as more than a collectivity of individuals.

For

him there is a supra-individual reality that expresses order as the
maintenance of collective life.

DurkheinTs notion of social facts

represents structure as objective, material as well as non-material, and
external to the actor (Coenen, 1981).

There is no doubt, however, that

Durkheim struggles with the role of the individual when referring to the
origins of these social facts.

And, he never really resolves the dilemma

that the decisions of individual actors somehow form the foundation of
order.
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Structure itself is revealed in society's becoming and one can
only illuminate it on condition of not losing sight of this
process of becoming and changing. It (social structure) is
constantly becoming and changing (forming and breaking down);
it is life having crystallized to a degree; and to distinguish
it from the life from which it derives or the life that
determines it amounts to dissociating inseparable things.
(Durkheim, 1900 in Wilson, 1981, p.1060)

The above quote seems to beg attention to origins of social facts.

How do

individuals contribute to the development of social facts and how are
collective representations legitimated?

At this level Durkheim recognizes

the dialectic of social structure and expresses it as a problem of order.
That is to say, social structure is external thing, constraining force,
and constructed process all at the same time.

While recognizing this

paradox, Durkheim is not about to reduce sociology to psychology and
therefore chooses sociological reductionism (DiTomaso, 1982).

When the

choice seems explicit in his work, Durkheim might be labeled
unidimensional in his thinking (Alexander, 1982a).

And yet Durkheim also

reveals a pattern of flexibility in his studies that points to
multidimensional reasoning about order, structure, and human action.

How is it that, at the same time as the individual becomes
more autonomous, he depends more closely on society? How can he
be at the same time more individuated [personnel] and more
solidary? For it is indisputable that these two developments,
contradictory though it may appear, occur in a parallel way
(Durkheim cited in Giddens, 1977, p.274).

So Durkheim focuses on developed structures and assumes that they are
somehow intimately related to the individual (e.g., Durkheim 1938, 1978).
Interpreters of Durkheim who attend only to his inconsistent and
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contradictory analyses of the individual, ignore the centrality of an
autonomous order in his work.

The frequent contradictions in terms of

theoretical strategies between the individualistic and social, and the
normative and instrumental point to Durkheim's appreciation of the
dialectic— not to a weakness in his work.

He emphasizes order without

denying action, and puzzles with an obvious paradox in their relationship.
In discussing the social order, Durkheim refers both to the fact of
normative control and to the condition of stability (Alexander, 1982b).
This exemplifies the inherent dialectic of order and is critical to
understanding Durkheim's functionalist perspective.

The tension or

perhaps balance of Durkheim's vision is illustrated by his discussion on
the variance of law and morality from one social type to the next, and the
change within a particular type if conditions of life are modified
(Durkheim, 1978).

Every pattern is an obstacle to new patterns, to the extent that
the first pattern is inflexible. The better a structure is
articulated, the more it offers a healthy resistance to all
modification; and this is equally true of functional, as of
anatomical, organization.
. . .
Nothing is good indefinitely
and to an unlimited extent. The authority which the moral
conscience enjoys must not be excessive; otherwise no one would
dare criticize it, and it would too easily congeal into an
immutable form. To make progress, individual originality must
be able to express itself (p.17).

Durkheim"s awareness of the dialectic of structure is clearly evidenced in
the above.

His explanation of the normal and pathological is functional.

Still, it is rooted in the contradictions inherent to the subject matter.
He struggles with the role of the individual, but in the end addresses
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more pointedly the order perspective and how structure is maintained.
Origins is given short shrift.
Weber: A n Action Orientation
Like Durkheim, Weber sees the paradoxical character of the subject
matter.

For him the origins of social structure are far more important

than its maintenance.

This is evidenced by his attempts to capture

rationality at the subjective level as logically prior condition of an
external social order.

However,

it is important to recognize Weber's

response to the dialectic of social structure as it is expressed from the
action side.

In his related discussions of the forms of rationality and

types of social action (Kalberg,

1980;

studied appreciation of the importance,

Levine,

19811, Weber shows a

independence, and constraining

effects of an external order on the actor.

This is exemplified in his

discussion of the "rational conditioning" of scientific management.

The psycho-physical apparatus of man is completely adjusted to
the demands of the outer world, the tools, the machines— in
short, it is functionalized, and the individual is shorn of his
natural rhythm as determined by his organism;
in line with the
demands of work procedure, he is attuned to a new rhythm through
the functional specialization of muscles and through the
creation of an optimal economy of physical effort.
(Weber cited
in Brubaker, 1984, pp.l4f).

Weber's notion of rational social action is especially critical for
developing a dialectical conception of what is to be explained.
Economy and Society

In

(19b8) Weber defines types of social action in terms

of meaning frames of the actor.

If concrete actors are the source of
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•‘'social order"'* for Weber (Alexander, 1983a);

and if social

relationships consist "entirely and exclusively in the existence of a
probability that

there will be a meaningfulcourse of social

(Weber, 1968, p.26f.);

then the actor must

action**

serve as bothsubject

object of social

structure, lest there be no social order

another way, the

actor as either subject or

at all.

and
Stated

object cannot be a

predetermined condition of social action if there is to be some logic to
collective life.

If such is true in the relationship between ego and

alter, then the translation of individual ends as collective means is even
more pronounced when action is aggregated into broader social units.
Weber's pessimistic interpretation of bureaucracy is illustrative of this
point.

Once it is fully established, bureaucracy is among those
social structures which are the hardest to destroy. Bureaucracy
is the means of carrying 'community action' over into rationally
ordered 'societal action.' Therefore, as an instrument for
'societalizing' relations of power, bureaucracy has been and is
a power instrument of the first order— for the one who controls
the bureaucratic apparatus (Weber, 1958b, p.228).

The conclusion here is that Weber has captured the dialectic of social
structure but, in contrast to Durkheim, he expresses it from an action
perspective.
Alexander (1983a) credits Weber with distinguishing between types of
rationality and social action.

However, he criticizes him for not

adhering consistently to a multidimensional tradition in his sociology.
Certainly Weber's analysis is, as Alexander suggests, **unfailingly
ambivalent."

But perhaps this is because Weber was far more intent on
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description than explanation.

That is to say, he was not trying to

describe action to explain order or vice versa.

Rather he was trying to

describe the dialectic of social structure that he observed in his
historical comparative studies.

As evidenced in the

even as he focuses on social action, he does not

Protestant Ethic,

deny the existence of an

equally viable social order in describing capitalism.

The capitalistic economy of the present day is an immense cosmos
into which the individual is born, and which presents itself to
him . . .
as an unalterable order of things in which he must
live. It forces the individual, in so far as he is involved in
the system of market relationships, to conform to capitalistic
rules of action. The manufacturer who in the long run acts
counter to these norms, will just as inevitably be eliminated
from the economic scene as the worker who cannot or will not
adapt himself to them will be thrown into the streets without a
job. (Weber, 1958a, pp.55f cited in Brubaker, 1984, p.23).

At this more substantive level, Weber examined social structure as a
process wherein social action is made central.
In order to accomplish this
strategy of ideal types.

Weber developed the

methodological

His historical and transhistorical ideal types

are important for examining and rendering intelligible patterns of action
(Turner, 1983).

Historical ideal types (e.g., bureaucracy, capitalism)

express the content of social happenings.

Transhistorical ideal types

(the four modes of action) establish the elements from which historical
ideal types are composed.

The purpose of ideal types is to facilitate

interpretation of the subjective meaning of structure as it is produced
and reproduced by the human actor.

Weber's method also makes explicit the

problem of linking epistemologically the observer with the observed— a

24

concern not addressed by Durkheim and frequently overlooked today.

The

question is what are the rules that link ideal types, the observer who
uses them, and the observed subject?

Such rules remain to be developed

(Giddens, 1976).
Weberns methodological strategy is extended by Kreps' (1985, ch.4)
ongoing research.

Kreps employs the ideal types methodology in observing

what he terms forms of human association (Simmel, 1908).

Kreps'

historical ideal types— the 64 forms of association— link the observer to
the content of social action.

Content implies the historical events

themselves and their culturally specific meanings.

Form expresses the

sequencing of these events and the timing of communications through which
these specific meanings are collectively represented.

As such, the

communications are devoid of meaning, reflecting simply the organization
of information (Mayhew, 1980;

1981).

Kreps' continuum and metric link

these historical ideal types to two transhistorical ideal types:

social

order and social action.
Transhistorical ideal types link the observer to what is not
observed.
constructs.

For Weber the four modes of action were termed mental
In neo-Kantian fashion, Kreps defines social order and social

action as transcendental knowledge (i.e., real but not observable).

The

importance of transhistorical ideal types is their ‘‘objective" nature, one
which is enhanced by intersubjective agreement.

Content and form are

therefore defined through subjective (Weber) as well as objective (Kant)
lenses in Kreps' framework.

His four core elements are put into precise

relationships, in terms of identifiable rules of transformation.
In the end, Kreps' extension of Weber's methodology makes it possible
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to describe the contradictions of action and order in structure.
Explanation is a completely different matter.

At that level one can

freely emphasize either individual or collective properties of structure.
The admonition implied by Weber, and also Durkheim from the order side, is
simply this:

avoid collapsing description and explanation at the level of

defining what is to be explained.

That is to say, one must not describe

action to explain order or vice versa.
a dialectical relationship between them.

To the contrary, one must describe
The result for Kreps is a

taxonomy of forms that is neither psychologically nor sociologically
reductionist (DiTomaso, 1982).
Weber's concern with describing structure as process culminated in
the development of taxonomies— most notably his four forms of social
action.

Durkheim also recognized the power of taxonomies as descriptive

devices, as evidenced by his work with forms of social order.

In sum,

Weber and Durkheim define a unique subject matter for sociology.

In so

doing they provide parallel conceptions of social structure that are
equally dialectical.

Finally, they point to the essential role of

classification for describing social structure:
of ideal types;
social facts.

Weber in his discussions

and Durkheim by his methodological rules for examining
As further detailed below, Kreps highlights the symmetry of

Weber and Durkheim with reference to the content and form of structure.

RESOLUTION OF A PARADIGM DILEMMA:
WORKING AT THE MARGINS OF
INTERPRETIVE AND POSITIVIST SOCIOLOGY

The concern with the dialectic of social structure is at the core of
the contributions of Durkheim and Weber.

By distinguishing between

defining and explaining the subject matter of sociology, they provide a
model for advancing knowledge of structure.

Weber comes to the dialectic

from the perspective of social action, thereby emphasizing the psychic
states and behaviors of human beings.

Durkheim comes to it from the

perspective of social order, and focuses on the collective representations
and normative force of social units.

While each points to types of social

structure, neither has an elaborate taxonomy.
realized until this has been accomplished.

Their legacy will not be

The task will not be easy.

To

date, there is little consensus in sociology about the definition of
structure, how it comes into being, how it is maintained, and how it ends.
At least some of the confusion stems from the fact that sociology has
two competing paradigms and the proponents do not share a vision of what
social structure is.

As conceptualized by Kreps (1985, ch.3) sociology

has three paradigms— what he terms interpretive, positivist, and
structural sociologies.

Interpretive sociology is attentive to action,

positivist sociology to order, and structural sociology to both action and
order.

Interpretive and positivist sociologies are predominant, while

structural sociology is implicit and marginal to the other two.

Using

Alexander's (1982a) terminology, every social scientist makes
presuppositional decisions about human action and how it is collectively
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patterned.
implicit.

Unfortunately, these presuppositions are usually left
It is both Alexander's and Kreps' intent to make them explicit,

thereby revealing the paradigmatic character of sociology in more stark
relief.
As illustrated in Figure 1, Kreps suggests that the presuppositional
position of interpretive sociology makes action (and the actor) central.
Order is benign abstraction that is produced and reproduced.

Positivist

sociology proclaims the preeminence of order (and the external unit).
actor is passive and action is patterned and conditional.

The

Structural

sociology acknowledges the autonomy and unity of action (and the actor)
and order (and the unit).

Because of this dialectical expression of

structure, both action and order are necessarily implicated in the
explinandum of structural sociology.
developed.

That explinandum remains to be

When that time comes, and to the extent that a structural

explicandum can be shared by interpretive and positivist sociologists,
complementary explanations of social structure can be developed within the
two dominant paradigms.

It should be added that a dialectical conception

of social structure precludes grand synthesis.
be additive development of knowledge.

The approach instead must

In other words, actor and unit

explanations of social structure will never be synthetic.

Indeed, the

quest for synthesis collapses description and explanation of collective
life into a hopeless morass.
incompatible.

But neither will these explanations be

Rather, they will be combinatorial explanations arrived at

independently by positivist and interpretive sociologists.
The first and most critical step is defining the common subject
matter.

What is the generic meaning, the most encompassing definition of
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FIGURE 1:

Sociological Paradigms As They
Relate to the Dialectic of
Action and Order
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what is to be explained?

Heretofore, little sustained effort has been

made to answer this question.

As indicated in Figure 1, to do so within

structural sociology requires taxonomies which reveal the autonomy and
unity of action and order.

Only when the taxonomy problem has been solved

can model building usefully derive from the two dominant paradigms.

At

that point actor based and unit based reductionism are equally viable.
Once defined and located, it is possible to examine the origins of
any phenomenon that is of interest.
social structure created?

The relevant question here is how is

On the other hand, it is equally feasible to

examine the growth, development, and survival of any phenomenon.
relevant question here is how is social structure maintained.
questions are logical and equally important.

The

Both

However, answers to them

possibly yield different explanations of a common subject matter.

Whether

it is creation or maintenance, answers from interpretive sociology will
point to the dynamism of the actor while answers from positivist sociology
will point to the dynamism of the unit.
adequately explain structure?

Does one perspective more

I think not.

The conclusion here is that action and order explanations of
structure are equally viable and should be developed independently.

With

alternative explanations provided, perhaps it will be possible to unravel
the dialectic of structure.

Once again, the theorist must make a choice

at the level of explanation.

In giving primacy to either actor or unit,

the theorist must also recognize that any model developed will be partial.
Such is the path toward knowledge:

a dialectical conception of social

structure shared by interpretive and positivist sociologists and
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reductionist explanatory models developed within the boundaries of the two
respective paradigms.

The additive results of such models will hopefully

provide a more comprehensive understanding of structure.
By cross classifying order as unit and process with the actor as
object and subject, Kreps develops the four-fold table illustrated on
Figure 2.

Notice that positivist, interpretive, and structural

sociologies are all represented.

The figure serves to distinguish between

the domains of description and explanation.

The first and fourth cells

depict structural sociology and the dialectic of action and order as a
problem of describing structure as the subject matter of sociology.

In

Kreps' theory example of structural sociology (discussed further below),
such description is captured by a taxonomy of the forms of human
association.

The explanation of these forms commands attention to cells 2

and 3 and the unique modes of positivist and interpretive sociologies.
Positivist sociology points to the unit as given and provides order based
explanations of these forms.

Interpretive sociology points to the actor

as given and provides action based explanations of these forms.
As further discussed in the next section, one of the few contemporary
studies which intentionally works at the margins of interpretive and
positivist paradigms is Kreps' research on disaster and social structure.
As mentioned earlier, he relies equally on Durkheim and Weber.
studies Kreps bridges content and form;

Using case

observer and observed;

qualitative and quantitative methods in describing forms of human
association.

and
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FIGURE 2:

Unidimensional and Dialectical
Perspectives on Action and Order

Structure
(Order)
Process

Obj ec t

Unit

1
Structural
Sociology

2
Positivist
Sociology

3
Interpretive
Sociology

4
Structural
Sociology

Actor
(Action)

Sub jec t

Paradigms in Sociology

1. Actor as object - structure as process:
Structural Sociology (dialectical)

2. Actor as object - structure as unit:
Positivist Sociology (order biased)

3. Actor as subject - structure as process:
Interpretive Sociology (action biased)

4. Actor as subject - structure as unit:
Structural Sociology (dialectical)

A SUBSTANTIVE BASE:

KREPS" TAXONOMY OF FORMS

Metatheoretically, Kreps expresses structure as a dialectical
relationship between action and order.

Substantively, he evidences

structure as alternate forms of human association.

Empirically capturing

these forms is, first and foremost, a problem of taxonomy.

The resulting

theory of organization as unit and process is grounded in the disaster
context.

Employing a comparative case study approach, Kreps identifies

423 instances of organization from 15 disaster events (earthquakes,
hurricanes, floods, tornadoes).

His qualitative analyses are of

interviews and documents from the Disaster Research Center archives
(University of Delaware) of studies of local community responses to
selected natural disasters.

Working with these data to reconstruct what

happened, Kreps devises a strategy for distinguishing organization from
other forms of human association.

In that regard, he defines what are

termed individually necessary and collectively sufficient elements of
organization as form of association.
matters of logic and evidence.

Some 24 such forms are identified as

Kreps therefore uses this definition to

develop a structural taxonomy of, in the Weberian sense, historical ideal
types.

In his original spadework, Kreps did not know nor did he foresee

the development of a quantitative metric which would substantively connect
the 24 forms to two transhistorical ideal types.

The two transhistorical

ideal types reflect a continuum, with social order at one end and social
action at the other.

What amounts to a case of serendipity (Merton, 1957)

reinforces the importance of a flexible qualitative methodology.

Without

fully anticipating the emergent quantitative significance of his studies,
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Kreps emphasized the development of taxonomy.
The actor is both subject and object, and order is both process and
unit in Kreps" framework.

While the model that he develops falls within

positivist sociology, he encourages alternative models from interpretive
sociology.

In the latter mode more attention would be given to using

individual perceptions, attitudes, intentions, and behaviors as explanans
of the organizational forms that have been identified.

Thus while the

limitations of the archival data restricted Kreps" model to the positivist
perspective, his taxonomy captures the dialectic of structure from either
paradigm.

The following brief discussion summarizes how this was done.

As noted in the introduction, in Kreps' theory existence of
organization is defined as the presence of four individually necessary and
collectively sufficient elements:

domain (D), tasks (T), human and

material resources (R), and activities (A).

Each element is analytically

unique and no pattern of all four can be assumed a priori.

Thus, their

ordering indicates when each element appears as a part of the origins of
organization in the disaster context.

Such sequencing in time and space

of the four core elements yields 24 logically possible forms of
organization and, as part of a process 40 non-organizational forms of
association.

The resulting 64 element patterns express, as matters of

content and form, a possible explicandum for structural sociology.
Drawing from DurkheinTs conception of social facts (Kreps, 1985,
ch.4), two of the elements, domain (D) and tasks (T), are interpreted as
collective representations of organized activities, as they might be tied
to DurkheinTs sociological idealism.

The remaining two elements,

resources (R) and activities (A), reflect more directly the sociological
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materialism of Weber and to some extent Marx.

Treated independently,

Kreps (1985, ch.4) defines the elements as follows:

Domain (D)
Domains are bounded spheres of human activity which point
to the existence of a unit and what it does. As things, domains
are collectively represented in the communications of (1) those
included in these spheres of activity and (2) those who interact
with them at the boundaries of the unit (Levine and White, 1961;
Thompson, 1967; Haas and Drabek, 1973). Domains translate
actual or threatening physical and social impacts as units of
social action. The many types of domains encompass the time
periods before (e.g., warning), during (e.g., evacuation), and
after (e.g., reconstruction) the event. A unit specification
does not imply anything else about the existence (or
achievement) of organization. As individually necessary
condition of organization, then, domain points to a form of
association that is distinct from all others. Its establishment
may take place at any point in the origins of organization.
Tasks (T)
Tasks are specifications of a division of labor for the
enactment of human activity. As things, tasks independently
define the unit quality of social action. While domain
represents social structure as open system that is legitimated
internally and externally, tasks point to it as closed system
that is structured from within (Thompson, 1967; Perrow, 1967).
As part of a process, tasks are a unique expression of form.
They may come to exist at any point in the origins of
organization.
Human and Material Resources (R)
Resources are the material technologies and subjective
attributes of human populations. Their presence in a process as
things comes to be defined with reference to the unit quality of
social structure, but they may be mobilized prior to or
following the emergence of domains and tasks. Resources are
both static and dynamic: static because their relevance as a
part of organization is conditioned by the external reality of
domains and tasks; dynamic because domains and tasks are, at
the same time, social constructions of human beings.
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Activities (A)
Activities are the interdependent actions of human
populations which at once establish and are conditioned by
social structure. As things, activities are the remaining
social means of organization which although analytically
distinct, relate symmetrically with its interpretation as unit
and process. Activities are no more or less analytically
important than the remaining three elements. Certainly all of
the four elements are grounded in the actor, as reality and as
creator of the social order. However, the elements are equally
represented by the social unit, as reality and normative force.
Thus just as organization is at once static and dynamic, so too
are the activities of human beings (Warriner, 1956; 1970;
Giddens, 1979; Alexander, 1982a).
To repeat, in describing alternative forms of human association, each
element is logically and empirically independent.
or order of the elements can be assumed.

Thus, no single pattern

The resulting taxonomy includes

64 forms of association (see Table 2, p.9), only 24 of which represent
organization as Kreps defines the term from the perspective of structural
sociology.

The processual pattern of the elements implies the extent to

which a given form of organization is order or action driven.

Consistent

with DurkheinTs notion of collective representations, order-driven
patterns reveal the early emergence of domains and tasks.

Ends predicate

means, the unit appears as dynamic, and the actor is seen as passive
object of structure.

Related to Weber's types of social action,

order-driven patterns reflect “instrumentally rational" action.

External

efficiency criteria are critical and "expectations as to the behavior of
(actors) .

.

.

are used as 'conditions' or 'means' for the attainment

of .

rationally pursued and calculated ends" (Weber, 1968, p.24,

emphasis added).
On the other hand, the early emergence of activities and resources
point to action-driven patterns.

Attention shifts to Durkheim's notion of

structure in a state of becoming or Weber's notion of substantive
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rationality.

Here means predicate ends, the actor appears as dynamic

subject rather than passive object, and the unit as conceptual abstraction
(Giddens, 1979).

As noted in the introduction, the midpoint of the metric

Kreps has constructed highlights the tension or balance of the forces of
social action and social order.

There is tension because order implies a

unit referent while action implies an actor referent.

There is balance

because the dialectic of structure captures both order and action.

That

is to say, the unit is both external thing and constructed object of
action;
thing.

and the actor is both prime mover and passive object of this
Such is the paradox that captured the respective imaginations of

Durkheim and Weber.

Such is the paradox that they observed in their

respective studies.

As long as it is recognized that both actor and

structure are analytical rather than concrete entities, and that each is
transitive as well as intransitive (Bhaskar, 1979), then there is no need
for a so-called building block of structure.

Freed of that ontological

requirement, the dialectic of structure is completely symmetrical.
put, structure is unit and process;
(Giddens, 1979;

Alexander, 1982a;

Simply

and actor is subject and object
Kreps, 1985).

For purposes of the present research, the organizational elements
capture the dialectic.
four elements (D, T, R.

As defined above, organization exists when all
and A) are present.

A processual

conceptualization of organization captures the contradictory relationship
of action and order as separate and integrated dimensions of human
association.

In other words, each element and combination of elements is

at once a form in and of itself and part of another form as it develops.
Each element is intransitive (exists as a fixed reality) and, at the same
time, transitive (changing, becoming).

So with the earlier T-R-A-D
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example of origins, T is in and of itself an important phenomenon.
also relevant as the initial step in the organizing process.

It is

It is

possible then, to look at the accumulation of elements as stages in the
development or emergence of organization.

Each stage in this development

(e.g., T, TR, TRA, TRAD) can be seen as independently and sequentially
significant.

Each, therefore, is an important focus of analysis.

In the disaster context a processual perspective on organization
reveals that people are making choices under conditions where normal
routines have been disrupted (Kreps, 1985, ch.3).

Their improvisations

are empirically grounded by the historical circumstances in which they
occur— circumstances which point to the dialectic of structure.
Specifically, both role-making and role-playing (Turner, 1978) are being
evidenced and the distinction between them implies Kreps' discussion of
interpretive and positivist sociologies.

In sociology role is generally

defined as (1) social expectations of (2) behavior, both of which relate
to (3) identifiable positions in (A) observable social units (Stryker,
1980).

The argument here is that to even speak of role is to beg a choice

between interpretive and positivist sociologies in any effort to unravel
the forms of association which Kreps has identified.

That is to say,

while the forms may be described dialectically, any effort to explain them
must draw uniquely from the two dominant paradigms in the field.

That is

to say, the human being must be treated as either autonomous creator or
constrained object of social structure;

and the social unit must be

treated as either real entity or constructed abstraction.
The above definition encompasses both stable and fluid forms of
social organization.

Turner's concern with role-taking illustrates the

usefulness of role in distinguishing between action and order in the
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present research (Stryker, 1980).

Structured social expectations shape

the course of interaction when an actor puts himself in the place of
another and adjusts his behavior accordingly.

But if roles are not well

defined, role-taking yields newly defined roles and expectations or what
can be termed role-making.

In the disaster setting there is often

sufficient ambiguity in role-taking to allow for role-making.

When the

latter occurs the actor is, in effect, creating structure through
decisions and behaviors.

A resulting interpretation of the actor as

dynamic subject of structure is central for explaining forms of
association within interpretive sociology.

By contrast, the concept of

role-playing emphasizes action as patterned and conditional.

The actor is

deciding and behaving within socially defined expectations of what to do.
Accordingly, the unit is thought of as apart from the actor when forms of
association are explained within positivist sociology.

Thus, the

venerable concept of role provides one way of building from
multidimensional description Jto unidimensional understandings of
organizational forms.

It is hoped that the attempt to make this

transition will implicate the unique explanatory importance of the two
dominant paradigms in sociology.
Specifically, using role-making and role-playing to distinguish
between the creation and maintenance of structure, this thesis examines
thirty-eight of the thirty-nine midpoint cases identified in Kreps' work.
(Interviews and documents are not presently available for one case, a
T-R-A-D form.)

As noted earlier, these midpoint cases reflect the balance

or tension between action and order.

For purposes of this thesis these

cases are ideal because circumstances aren't biased toward either action
or order explanations.

Rather, they provide a beautiful context for a
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consideration of role as it is employed uniquely within interpretive and
positivist sociologies.

Each enactment (1, 2, 3 and 4 elements present)

will be analyzed as a four-stage organizing process.

For each stage of

origins, the relative importance of role-making and role-playing will be
assessed independently as each contributes to understanding what is
happening.

That completed, role-making and role-playing will be examined

further with reference to other characteristics of responses and disaster
events.

ACTION, ORDER, AND STRUCTURE:

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Kreps" taxonomy and metric present the dialectic of action and order
as a problem of description.

Albeit tentatively, I try to go beyond

description in the current work via an assessment of role-playing versus
role-making at the origins of organization.

Using the same archival data

and case study approach that Kreps used, the present study focuses on
thirty-eight midpoint forms previously located by him.

Because the six

midpoint forms highlight equally the dyanamics of action and order, it was
felt that both role-playing and role-making would be evidenced and,
perhaps, at each stage of origins (1, 2, 3, and 4 elements present).

By

going beyond Kreps" methodological framework we can, in effect, address
more pointedly the problems of explaining the contradictory subject matter
defined in the classical works of both Weber and Durkheim.
The interviews and documents from the Disaster Research Center are
the same data Kreps analyzed in his work (see Table 3).

Of the

thirty-nine empirically documented midpoint cases I have reexamined
thirty-eight.

The research strategy involved (1) describing what was

happening at each stage of the origins of organization, (2) evaluating
each stage as to whether it was dominated by either role-making or
role-playing, (3) identifying problems at the origins of organization, and
(4) examining other variables as possibly influencing the dynamics of
role-making and role-playing.
First and foremost the methodology is the comparative case study.
Each instance of organization was previously described by Kreps.
judgments about form of origins replicate his earlier ones.

The

methodology employed by Kreps and myself prompts questions about
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My
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TABLE 5:

Samples of Events, Interviews,
and Organized Responses

Total Sample
Interviews Responses

Events

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Alaska Earthquake
1964
Hurricane Betsy
(New Orleans), 1965
St. Paul, Minn. Floods
1965
Minneapolis, Minn.
Tornadoes, 1965
Central South Colorado
Floods, 1965
Mankato, Minn. Flood,
1965
Topeka, Kansas Tornado
1966
Belmond, Iowa Tornado,
1966
Jackson, Miss. Tornado
1966
Fairbanks, Alaska Flood,
1967
Oak Lawn Chicago, 111.
Tornado, 1967
Jonesboro, Ark. Tornado,
1968
Hurricane Camille (Gulf
Coast), 1969
Minot, North Dakota Flood,
1969
Fargo, North Dakota Flood,
1969
Totals

1
2
6
6

earthquake
hurricanes
tornadoes
floods

-

250
198
330
284

Midpoint Cases
Interviews Responses

250

92

13

7

128

36

7

4

50

6

2

1

30

7

58

33

3

3

22

4

3

1

143

64

12

6

13

7

1

1

50

8

—

98

56

13

5

59

18

4

3

35

22

5

1

70

36

9

4

37

16

2

1

19

18

1

1

1062

423

75
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interviews, 92 organized
interviews, 72 organized
interviews, 126 organized
interviews, 133 organized

responses
responses
responses
responses
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thresholds— when does an element begin or cease to exist with reference to
a form of association?

When is a stream of events collectively

represented as a legitimate sphere of action?

What constitutes

interdependent or joint actions— in terms of number of actors involved and
their relationships?

While the identification of the elements is

replicable, precise thresholds for their existence have not been developed
by Kreps or me.

Rather, we communicate qualitative sequences of events to

communicate threshold judgments that are, in the Weberian sense,
plausible.
Measurement of Role-Making and Role-Playing
Kreps' methodology makes no distinction between role-making and
role-playing.

Referring again to Figure 2, role-making points to the

actor and Interpretive Sociology (cell 3).
unit and Positivist Sociology (cell 2).

Role-playing points to the

While Kreps' earlier description

of the forms highlights cells 1 and 4 (Structural Sociology), their
explanation requires attention to Interpretive and Positivist sociologies.
I do not seek synthetic explanations of these forms.

Rather, I search for

unique contributions from each of the two paradigms for understanding the
process of organization.

As noted in some detail earlier, I think this

strategy is in keeping with Durkheim, Weber, and more contemporary
discussions of role.

Is, for instance, a key resource (R) socially

recognized prior to the event or is it an improvisation specific to the
emergency period?

Are tasks (T) structured by pre-disaster roles, or do

they emerge willy-nilly as needs dictate?

Do activities (A) reflect

expected behavior or are actors creating responses unassociated with
pre-disaster experiences?

Is domain declared and legitimated by those
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FIGURE 2:

Unidimensional and Dialectical
Perspectives on Action and Order

Structure
(Order)
Process

Unit

1
Structural
Sociology

2
Positivist
Sociology

3
Interpretive
Sociology

4
Structural
Sociology

Actor
(Action)

Paradigms in Sociology

1. Actor as object - structure as process:
Structural Sociology (dialectical)

2. Actor as object - structure as unit:
Positivist Sociology (order biased)

3. Actor as subject - structure as process:
Interpretive Sociology (action biased)

4. Actor as subject - structure as unit:
Structural Sociology (dialectical)
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expected to do so, or do others not generally identified with a particular
response collectively represent the ends?

As described in the previous

section, role-making and role-playing distinctions beg questions of
whether structure is being created or maintained*

For purposes of this

thesis, such distinctions are relevant at each stage in the origins of
organization.

For instance, in the T-R-A-D form described earlier, the

task structure was noted as the first element present at the origins of
organization (T).

The methodological problem is to determine whether its

enactment evidences role-playing (and order), role-making (and action), or
some combination of both.

At each subsequent stage the same problem must

be addressed for every new combination of elements (T-R, T-R-A, and
T-R-A-D).

At each stage, then, the effort is not to describe the form

(Kreps' strategy) but to represent what is happening with reference to two
unique expressions of role. Role-playing points to positivist sociology.
Role-making points to interpretive sociology.

The requirement is to use

both paradigms, additively, in accounting for a process already described.
A set of criteria has been developed for purposes of making more
explicit judgments about role-playing versus role-making at the four
stages of origins.

Developing insights from Turner's (1978) and Stryker's

(1980) work on the role concept, the four criteria include:
boundary expansion versus unique roles;

(1) role

(2) continuity versus

discontinuity of pre- and post-impact role relationships;
versus heterogeneity of roles of key participants;

(3) homogeneity

and (4) consistency

versus inconsistency of pre- and post-disaster status/role.

As a group,

the criteria shed light on whether, at a given stage of a particular case,
role-making dominates, role-playing dominates, or both are necesssary to

45

describe what is happening.

Each criterion in the set is scored in the

following way:

Role boundary expansion versus unique role performance:
l=unique role performance, role-making dominates
2=mix of unique role performance and role boundary expansion
3=role boundary expansion, role-playing dominates
9=uncertain
Continuity versus discontinuity of pre- and post-impact
role relationships:
l=discontinuity of pre- and post-impact role
relationships, role-making dominates
2=mix of discontinuity and continuity of pre- and post
impact role relationships
3=continuity of pre- and post-impact role
relationships, role-playing dominates
9=uncertain
Homogeneity versus heterogeneity of roles of key participants
l=roles homogeneous, role-making dominates
2=roles heterogeneous with undefined task structure
3=roles heterogeneous with defined task structure,
role-playing dominates
9=uncertain
Consistency versus inconsistency of pre- and post
disaster status/role:
l=pre- and post-disaster status/role inconsistent,
role-making dominates
2=mix of inconsistent and consistent pre- and
post-disaster status/role
3=pre- and oost-disaster status/role consistent,
role-playing dominates
9=uncertain

With regard to the first criterion, role-making dominates where no
collective representation of roles exists at a given stage.
dominates when such representation does exist.

Role-playing

An example of the former

would be spontaneous search and rescue by people who happen to be in or
near an impacted area.

An example of the latter would be search and

rescue in this same impacted area by anyone having relevant training.
Evidence of both unique roles and boundary expansion indicates that
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neither role-making nor role-playing dominates at this stage.

The attempt

with this and the remaining criteria is to make clean analytical
distinctions of role dynamics.

When the data do not allow that, the stage

is coded uncertain for that criterion (N=16 across all criterion and
stages).
With regard to the second criterion, when multiple roles of a
post-impact response are not generally connected prior to the disaster,
role relationships are not socially defined and must be created by the
participants.

In this circumstance role-making is being evidenced.

On

the other hand, role-playing dominates in instances where pre-impact
relationships among roles are mirrored in role relationships of a disaster
response.

For example, inconsistency of role relationships is exemplified

when, at an emergency first aid station volunteer station wagon owners
provide ambulance service as directed by trained medical personnel.
Experienced ambulance drivers providing the same service is indicative of
consistent role relationships before and after impact.

Neither

role-making nor role-playing dominates when there is a mixture of
consistency and inconsistency among pre- and post-impact role
relationships.

Once again, when there is insufficient evidence available

to cleanly isolate role-making from role-playing, the cases are scored
uncertain.
The third criterion points to whether or not the roles of a response
are homogeneous, heterogeneous with a defined task structure, or
heterogeneous with an undefined task structure.

The first possibility

suggests that roles are undifferentiated and still in the process of being
defined.

For instance, volunteers offer to provide sandwiches for

victims.

Each participant is involved in the entire process of preparing
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the food, each develops his own technique for doing so, thus role-making
dominates.

With increased specialization and a defined task structure,

roles are more likely to be established, and behavior dictated by socially
controlled expectations.

Thus, as a production line for preparing

sandwiches is developed there is a shared understanding of appropriate
role enactment at each step of the process.

As others volunteer to assist

there is continuity in role performance so role-playing dominates.

When

roles are heterogenous, but a task structure is not well defined, there is
a mixture of role-making and role-playing.

Such is the case when sandwich

makers are developing a rudimentary production line.

Finally, no

conclusive judgment is possible where available data does not adequately
describe the roles involved in the response.

These cases are coded

uncertain.
The fourth criterion focuses on status/role consistency versus
inconsistency.

Status is defined here in terms of socially recognized

categories of actors (Stryker, 1980).

As such, they serve as "predictors*'

of behavior of those classified in a particular status, or position.
Socially defined expectations shape the behavior of and towards
positionally labeled individuals.

These expectations are termed roles.

This criterion addresses the level of consistency between position and
role.

Inconsistency requires greater attention to defining appropriate

behavior (role-making dominates), while consistency suggests accepted and
understood positions and behavior (role-playing dominates).

A college

student organizing faculty members in an evacuation effort is an example
of the former.

A faculty member organizing students is more consistent

with expected status/role and therefore exemplifies the latter.

A mixture

of both necessitates some redefining of status/role but also suggests a
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degree of stability in them based on previously shared collective
representations.
dominates.

In such cases neither role-making nor role-playing

When archival data prohibit interpretation of pre- or

post-impact status/role the case is coded as uncertain.
These four criteria provide a way of distinguishing between
role-making and role-playing during the origins of organization.
the four stages of origins was scored for each of the criteria.

Each of
As

outlined above, a score of 1 for any particular criterion at a given stage
indicates domination of role-making.
role-playing.

A score of 3 suggests dominance of

A mix of role-making and role-playing is given a score of 2

as the midpoint between the two extremes.

When the data do not provide

sufficient information to code a criterion as role-making, role-playing,
or a combination of the two, it is scored 9 (uncertain).

With 4 criteria

at each of 4 stages of origins for 38 cases, a total of 608 judgments
about role dynamics must be made.
coded uncertain was 2.6.

The aggregate percent of judgments

This low percentage suggsts that the archives

can yield clean demarcations of role dynamics.

For purposes of

statistical analysis, all criteria judged uncertain are recoded as the
midpoint score (2).

By then adding the scores across all four criteria,

the scores range from 4 (1 point on each of the four criteria:
role-making dominates) to 8 (2 points on each of the four criteria:

mix

of role-making and role-playing) to 12 (3 points on each of the four
criteria:

role-playing dominates) for each stage of origins.

For

purposes of subsequent statistical analyses, role-making versus
role-playing will be treated in two ways:

first as a continuous variable,

with higher scores referencing greater degrees of role-playing;

and

second, as a polytomous variable (role-making, mixed role-making and
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role-playing, and role-playing).
Because of the centrality of role-making versus role-playing to the
statistical analyses reported in the findings section, marginal
distributions will be reported there as the lead to the presentation of
data.

Discussion of the remaining variables examined in the study, and

their marginal distributions, concludes the current section.

These

variables will later serve as independent variables in the examination of
role-making and role-playing.

The effort involves a search for laws of

interaction that relate to the role concept rather than tests of specific
hypotheses (Dubin, 1978).
Measurement of Remaining Variables
The remaining variables of the study are broken down into the
following five sets:
organization;

(a) contingencies related to the four elements of

(b) structural characteristics of the enacting unit;

social network characteristics of the enacting unit;
temporal characteristics of the enacting unit;

(c)

(d) spatial and

and (e) characteristics of

the event and broader community.
a. Element Contingencies (DCON, TCON, RCON, ACON)
Element related contingencies or problems were recorded for each of
the 38 instances of organization examined.

For example, any questioning

of the appropriateness of an enacting unit's involvement in the event was
defined as a domain related contingency.

Confusion or disagreement about

how things were to be done was recorded as a task related problem.
Depletion of resources related to the response (e.g., damaged equipment or
losses of personnel) was defined as a resources related contingency.
Finally, disruption of activities (e.g., blocked access, overloaded
communications, secondary impacts) was considered an activities related
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problem.

Initial coding for element related contingency(ies) was as

follows:

(absent=l, present=2, uncertain=9).

The frequencies of

contingencies for the four elements were well distributed:
(N=18);

task related (N=18);

related (N=26).

resources related (N=13);

domain related
and activities

Because contingencies can arise at any time during the

process of organization, attempts were then made to distinguish between
those occurring at the origins of organization and those taking place
later (maintenance).

The data did not always provide sufficient

information to pinpoint the precise timing of the contingency.
is reflected in the following coding system:

no contingency present=l;

contingency present, onset at maintenance or uncertain=2;
present, onset at origins=3.

The result

contingency

Thus, the higher the score the more likely

the occurrence of a contingency at the origins of organization.

Some 9 of

18 domain related contingencies (DCON), 11 of 18 task related
contingencies (TCON), 4 of 13 resource related contingencies, and 19 of 26
activities related contingencies could be cleanly pinpointed at the
origins of organization.

The effort in all cases was to see if response

related problems were implicated with the dynamics of role-making and
role-playing.
b.

Characteristics of the Enacting Unit
(ELSTAGE1, FOT, SIZ, PLANN,

RTSTR, VLOSS, CDMGE)

A dummy variable (ELSTAGE1) was created to differentiate between
organizations initiated by domain or tasks (N=21) and those whose first
element was resources or activities (N=17).

It was thought that when the

first element reflected a collective representation of what was being done
and how (domain and tasks), then role-playing would be more evident in the
organizing process.

It should be added that by the logic of Kreps'
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metric, either domains or tasks are represented by stage two of the six
midpoint forms.
Three additional variables were designed to capture global
characteristics of each enacting social unit (FOT, SIZ, PLANN).

The first

variable identifies the type of focal organization engaged in the response
(FOT).

Responses of emergency relevant public bureaucracies (N=15) and

voluntary agencies (N=3) were dummied out.

Examples include police and

fire deparments, hospitals, Salvation Army, and Red Cross.

It was thought

that these types of units might exhibit greater evidence of role-playing
at the origins of organization because their general involvement and many
of their domains are collectively represented prior to disaster events.
Size (SIZ) was used as a general indicator of the structural
complexity of the responding unit.

Pre-disaster membership was measured

for organizations established prior to impact (e.g., police department,
Civil Defense).

For organizations with no pre-impact existence (e.g., an

emergent group of volunteers) size was recorded as the number of
participants.

Because of concern about measurement error with emergent

units in particular, an ordinal scale was used to measure size:

1=9 or

fewer (N=6), 2=10-20 (N=ll), 3=21-50 (N=6), 4=over 50 (N=ll), 9=uncertain
(N=4).

Uncertain cases were recoded to fall at the midpoint of the

distribution.
Third, a dummy variable (PLANN) was created for those units (by
necessity established) which had written disaster plans or formal training
(N=14).

The formal preparedness did not have to be specifically tied to

the event in question or even natural disasters.

For example, if the

Civil Defense had a formal strategy for responding to a nuclear attack but
no natural disaster plans, it was still recorded as having formal disaster
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preparedness.

It was felt that regardless of how vague preparedness was

(and in most cases it appeared to be so), the exercise of doing it would
result in increased evidence of role-playing.
The response task structure (RTSTR) of the enacting unit was also
measured.

It was felt that a more complex division of labor might be

associated with role-making in the circumstance of disaster.

Measurement

involved a recording of tasks that were collectively represented by
informant participants for each instance of organization.

The resulting

number of tasks provided a crude indicator of the complexity of the
division of labor during the response.

A case involving 4 or fewer tasks

was coded simple (N=17) and one with more than 4 was coded complex (N=19).
An example of a simple task structure would be compiling a list of
casualties and injured for a public information domain.

An example of a

complex task structure would be establishing a shelter for food, beds,
clothing, and medical attention as parts of a care of victims domain.
There were 2 cases where the complexity of the task structure could not be
determined with the available data.
purposes of statistical analysis.

These were recoded as simple for
As can be seen from the earlier case

illustrations, more general yet unique tasks were the ones represented in
the interviews.

This is in keeping with Durkheim's notion of social facts

as external (and therefore identifiable) collective representations of
what is taking place.
The remaining two variables in this block point to participant
interaction in the responding unit.

Each reflects a factor used to

sustain communication among participants.

Participant empathy and concern

with victims' emotional and material loss (VLOSS) was collectively
represented in 23 of the 38 cases.

Participant empathy and concern for

53

overall community loss (CDMGE) was collectively represented in 24 of the
38 cases.

It was felt that such empathy and concern might also be

reflected in role-making to meet the demands of the event.
c.

Social Network Characteristics
(PINT, INLINKS, ITLINKS)
Any instance of organization may be linked in various ways to a

broader network of social units.
this study.

Three possibilities were examined in

First, a determination was made (PINT) of whether the

response was largely self contained at initiation (N=13) or linked at
local, state, or national levels to a network of responding social units
(N=25).

The number of links (INLINKS) was also measured (0=none, N=13;

1=1-3, N=18;

2=more than 3, N=6;

9=uncertain, N=l).

The uncertain case

was recoded to fall at the midpoint of the distribution.

Finally, those

cases where the social networks were emergent (i.e., not established prior
to the event:

N=17) were distinguished from all others as a dummy

variable (ITLINKS).

It was felt that emergent, larger, and less

self-contained responses might increase the possibility of role-making.
d.

Spatial and Temporal Characteristics of Enacting Unit
LOC, INTIME
LOC was created to measure the physical location of the response

relative to the geographic area of primary impact.

Those responses taking

place within the impacted area were coded 1 (N=22) and those outside were
coded 0 (N=16).

It was thought that the former would reflect the often

rapid changes of demands during the emergency period by evidencing greater
degrees of role-making.
INTIME is a temporal variable measuring the time of enactment of the
first element of organization relative to impact.

Using an ordinal scale,
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time of enactment ranged from more than 72 hours before impact to more
than 72 hours following impact.

Either before of after impact, the higher

the score the greater the gap in hours between time of impact and
establishment of the first element of organization.

Those responses

beginning within 1 or 2 hours of impact were coded 1 (N=12), those between
3 and 24 hours were coded 2 (N=10), those between 25 and 72 were coded 3
(N=ll), and those more than 72 hours were coded 4 (N=5).
nonroutine events.

Disasters are

Thus, responses to them will necessarily be nonroutine

to some extent, regardless of whether they are initiated prior to or
following impact.

It was thought that those responses beginning

immediately pre- or post-impact (within 2 hours) would might reveal
interesting role dynamics as a simple function of the constraints of time,
e.

Characteristics of the Event and Broader Community
(EVENTTP, EVENT-MS, DOM-TP, COMM, C-EXP)
The variables labeled EVENTTP, EVENT-MS, and DOM-TP measure

characteristics of the events in which the responses took place.

The

first variable (EVENTTP) distinguishes the events in terms of their length
of forewarning.

A pattern of increasing time to get ready for impact

reflects differences between earthquakes (N=7), tornadoes (N=ll), floods
(N=12), and hurricanes (N=8).

It was thought that with less time to

mobilize in anticipation of an emergency there might be greater evidence
of role-making to meet urgent and unanticipated demands.
Some five of the events Kreps studied were more massive in terms of
their physical magnitude (deaths, injuries, damages) and/or geographic
scope of impact.

These events included the following:

Alaskan

earthquake, Hurricane Betsy, Topeka tornado, Fairbanks flood, and
Hurricane Camille.

Instances associated with these events (N=26) were
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separated from the rest and a dummy variable (EVENT-MS) was used for
purposes of statistical analysis.

The suspicion here was that the greater

social disruption associated with these events might increase role-making
to meet the needs of the emergency.
The third variable points to the domains of action of the 38 cases.
Kreps' earlier classification of disaster domains (1985, ch.4) was
collapsed to isolate those which were immediate post-impact and therefore
urgent;

and for which an accountable unit was less likely to have been

identified (collectively represented as such) prior to impact.

These

domains include search and rescue, post-impact evacuation, providing basic
victim needs other than medical care, and damage assessment.

A dummy

variable was used (DOM-TP) to distinguish the above types of domains
(N=31) from the others (N=7).
The final two variables point to community characteristics relevant
to disaster response.

First, a dummy variable (COMM) was created for

responses from communities where the population base was above 50,000 and
therefore metropolitan (N=24).

Second, a four level ordinal scale of

community disaster experience (C-EXP) in the previous 10 years was as
follows:

l=no disasters and few if any threats (N=6);

several threats (N=21);

2=no disasters but

3=one or more disasters (N=ll);

more disasters and several threats (N=0).

and 4=one or

Community size is a global

measure of the human and material resources of the impacted community.
Disaster experience represents the historical heritage of the community as
that relates generally to the circumstances of the event.

Both measures

point to advantages for dealing with the unusual circumstances of
disaster.

If so, they should be relevant to the dynamics of role.

The next section examines the results of statistical analyses in
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attempting to better understand the dynamics of role in disaster
responses.

Marginal distributions for the dependent variable are

presented first.

Then using correlation, regression, and discriminant

analysis, possible relationships between role-making— role-playing and the
above independent variables are explored.

FINDINGS

Role-making versus role-playing at the origins of organization serves
as the dependent variable in the analyses to follow.

Marginal

distributions for the dependent variable are presented initially and
discussed.

This is followed by presentation of correlation and regression

analyses, broken down by stage of origins.

Although not presented,

discriminant analysis has been used to replicate successfully the findings
from ordinary least squares (OLS).
Marginal Distributions of Role-Making— Role-Playing

Role-making versus role-playing is considered in two related ways for
purposes of statistical analysis.

First, it is treated as an ordinal

variable, with lower scores indicating greater degrees of role-making and
higher scores referencing greater degrees of role-playing.

Second, it is

treated as a polytomous variable which subsumes three dimensions:
role-making, mix role-making and role-playing, and role-playing.

While I

anticipated similar findings across the two modes of measurement, I
thought that the exploratory yield of substantively important
relationships might be higher with multiple measures of role.

Recalling

the original criteria for scoring role-making and role-playing (p.45),
Table 6 illustrates composite marginals, by element stage, for the 38
cases examined in this research.

(Marginals for the individual criteria

at each stage of organization can be found in Appendix 1).
The treatment of the dependent variable as a continuum of role-making
(scored 4) to role-playing (scored 12) indicates rather clearly an
increasing movement towards role-playing as organization is enacted.
Notice the wide distribution of scores at the first stage of origins (one
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TABLE 6:

Role-Making to Role-Playing
Distribution by Stage of Origins
Total Sample

Role-Making and
Role-Playing Scores

Element Stages
1

2

3

4

4

-

2

-

-

5

5

-

-

-

6

2

-

1

-

4

-

-

-

8

4

2

2

1

9

2

5

6

-

10

5

8

10

3

11

4

9

9

12

12

12

12

10

22

Totals

38

38

38

38
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element present).

In spite of the bias of the o r i g i n a l Disaster Research

Center studies— with attention focused on the responses of disaster
relevant public bureaucracies and voluntary agencies (60.3 percent of
Kreps' 423 cases and 47.4 percent of the present subsample)— 11 of the 38
cases (28.9 percent) evidenced a strain toward role-making (scores of 5,
6, and 7 on the composite score) and 11 others (28.9 percent) evidenced a
mix of role-making and role-playing (scores of 8, 9, and 10 on the
composite score).

It is very important to note that all role-playing at

stage 1 of origins involves an extension of the response from pre-disaster
routines.

However, subsequent role-playing (stages 2, 3, and 4) may have

little to do with pre-disaster routines for criteria 1 (role boundary
expansion versus unique role performance) and 3 (homogeneity-heterogeneity
of roles of key participants).

Here it is possible for role-playing to be

circumscribed by the response and the event.

Keeping this in mind, notice

the increase in role-playing as organization emerges.

By the second stage

(2 elements present) there are dramatically fewer cases in which
role-making dominates (7.3 percent with a score of 4 on the composite).
Yet interestingly enough, it is at this second stage that what might be
termed "perfect role-making" (a score of 4) is recorded.

This is possible

because each stage is examined independently, and scores judged relative
to the number of elements present.

For example, perhaps at stage 1 a

defined task structure (T) sets off origins and is accompanied by greater
evidence of role-playing.

Then at stage 2 the mobilization of resources

(T-R) calls for a restructuring of the division of labor, and role-making.
Similarly, element related contingencies can arise at any time during the
life of an organization.

Such problems may render pre-disaster or
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response specific role expectations of little use for directing decisions
and behaviors.

It is therefore possible for role-playing to dominate

early in the process, while role-making comes into play later on.

Here

the marked movement towards role-playing from the first to second stages,
and at each subsequent stage of origins, evidences the increasing reality
of organization as external and constraining force on the actions of
participants.

As evidenced by stage 1 in particular, however, this

Durkheimian force is at the same time a Weberian social construction.
Moreover, Table 6 indicates that many organizations evidence a mix of
role-making and role-playing at both the second and third stages of
origins.

Thus even as collective representations of what is to be done

become more clearly defined with reference to participant communications,
circumstances continue to call for flexibility and improvisation.

By the

final stage of origins, when all of the four elements of organization are
in place, role-playing has become predominant.

Quite simply, one would

fully expect that to be the case.
For purposes of correlation and regression analyses, R0LEM-P1,
R0LEM-P2, and R0LEM-P3 scores are recoded in various ways as tri- or
bi-level measures.

The effort in all cases is to create statistically

manipulable marginal splits that, at the same time, maintain important
substantive distinctions.

At the first stage of organization, R0LEM-P1

scores are initially collapsed into three ordinalcategories and an
assumed continuum of role-making to role-playing.

Scores below the

midpoint score 8 reflect a strain toward role-making and are recoded 1
(N=ll);

scores of 8, 9, and 10 point to mix role-making and role-playing

and are recoded 2 (N=11);

and scores of 11 and 12 represent a strain

toward role-playing and are recoded 3 (N=16).

This three level ordinal
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variable is augmented by a dummying out of role-making (R0LEM1, scores of
1 on R0LEM-P1), mix role-making and role-playing (R0LEMIX1, scores of 2 on
R0LEM-P1), and role-playing (R0LEP1, scores of 3 on R0LEM-P1).
procedure is followed for R0LEM-P2 recoding:
role-making and role-playing=2 (N=15);

The same

role-making=l (N=2);

role-playing=3 (N=21).

mixed

Once

again, this ordinal measure is augmented by a dummying out of, in this
case mixed role-making and role-playing (R0LEMIX2, scores of 2 on
R0LEM-P2) and role-playing (R0LEP2, scores of 3 on R0LEM-P2).

The

marginal frequency is too small to dummy out role-making as a dependent
variable.

Because lust one score of 6 is below the midpoint for R0LEM-P3,

a single dummy variable which separates role-playing (scores of 11 and 12,
N=19) from everything else has been created for stage 3.

Note that the

marginal splits for R0LE4 point to the predominance of role-playing (34
cases with scores of 11 and 12).

Given the absence of variance in R0LE4,

no statistical analysis of this final stage has been undertaken.
Correlations and Regressions by Stages of Organization
Figure 3 is a graphic representation of an exploratory model of the
dynamics of role-making and role-playing at the origins of organization.
The four stages of origins are arrayed left to right with the acronyms
relevant to each stage listed in the appropriate boxes.

The several

blocks of independent variables are also listed, by acronym, on the left
hand side of the figure.

The lines with arrows indicate that the flow of

the model is left to right.

So at the first stage of origins, R0LEM-P1,

ROLE Ml, R0LEMIX1, and R0LEP1 serve as dependent variables with respect to
the exogenous variables.

Then moving to the next stage, these measures

serve as potential independent variables.

And so on.

The dashed line

between R0LEP3 and R0LE4 indicates that while this final stage is

Exploratory Model of Role Dynamics
at the Origins of Organization
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analytically important, it is not analyzed in the present study because
R0LE4 lacks sufficient variance to allow for further statistical
manipulation.
For each stage bivariate correlations are initially presented in
order to highlight those which are statistically significant at the .10
level or beyond.

(Appendix 2 records correlations, means, and standard

deviations for all dependent and independent variables.)

Then multiple

regression analyses are run to determine which of the isolated independent
variables have the most powerful unique effects.

Multiple stepwise

techniques have been employed in that regard, using a .10 significance
inclusion criterion for adding variables to equations.

While this

somewhat loose criterion increases the chance of Type I error, most of the
identified coefficients are at the .05 level of significance or better.
Although not reported here, all regression findings have been replicated
by discriminant analysis.

Successful replication with the latter

technique increases confidence that, for dichotomous or polytomous
dependent variables, unique effects identified by regression equations are
genuine.
a.

Stage 1 of Origins: One Element of Organization Present
Table 7 summarizes the significant correlations at the initial stage

of the origins of organization.
a social catalyst.

Recall that the disaster event is seen as

Thus even though most of the instances of organization

in this subsample were enacted by established units (27 of 38), existence
is not assumed for purposes of studying the process of organization.

An

element of organization exists only when it is documented as part of the
disaster-relevant response.

As Kreps points out (1985, ch.5), not only is

emergent organization characteristic of disaster, but the actions of many
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TABLE 7: Correlation Analysis:
Role-Making— Role-Playing Dynamics at Stage 1
Origins of Organization

Dependent Variables
Independent
Variables
ROLEM-PI SIG.
(Continuum)
EVENTTP

ROLEM1 SIG.
(Role- Making)
.22

.089

ROLE MI XI SIG.
(Mix)

R0LEP1 SIG.
(Role-Playing)

.45

.003

.039

-.21

.099

-.34

.019

.28

.042

.007

.36

.013

-.34

.019

-.37

.010

.26

.059

-.39

.007

PLANN

.27

.049

.34

.017

C-EXP

-.22

.088

-.25

.063

.25

.064

ELSTAGE1

.65

.000

-.71

.000

.22

.088

TCON

-.28

.042

.37

.011

-.23

.086

RTSTR

-.28

.042

.29

.35

.015

ITLINKS

-.40

INLINKS

PINT

COMM
INTIME

-.25

-.23

.068

.078
-.26

.059
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established units are often suspended during the emergency period.
nothing can be assumed about the nature of roles when organization

Thus,
is

created, or at any subsequent stage in its life history.

Table 7 indicates that if the first element of organization
established is D or T (the latter for all but one case in this subsample),
on the whole there is a much greater degree of role-playing at the first
stage of origins (ELSTAGE1:

r=.65 with R0LEM-P1 or role-playing;

with R0LEM1 or role-making;

r=.22 with R0LEMIX1 or mixed role-making and

role-playing;

and r=.45 with R0LEP1 or role-playing).

r=-.71

The findings

suggest that the early presence of a collectively represented division of
labor— or what might also be termed shared understandings of how a
response is to be enacted— provides a strong indication of the extent

to

which pre-disaster routines do, in fact, guide behavior in the disaster
setting.

At the same time, the positive correlation of ELSTAGE1 with

mixed role-making and role-playing (r=.22) suggests that social
expectations and improvised action mutually sustain one another in ways
that are difficult to unravel.
Additional evidence of role-playing is found where the enacting unit
has earlier engaged in some form of disaster preparedness (PLANN:
with R0LEM-P1 and r=.34 with R0LEP1);

r=.27

when the response is largely

self-contained as opposed to linked with a broader social network at
origins (PINT:
R0LEP1):

r=.35 with R0LEM-P1 and r=-.34 with R0LEM1, and r=.28 with

and when the response is enacted in metropolitan as opposed to

nonmetropolitan communities (COMM:

r=.25 with R0LEM-P1 and r=-.23 with

R0LEM1).

Disaster preparedness (PLANN) points to pre-defined role obligations

66

which are called forth by the occurrence of the unlikely event.

It

appears that at this earliest stage of origins, then, the increased
clarity of role demands engendered by preparedness decreases the
opportunity for what might be a facilitating mix of role-playing and
role-making (R0LEMIX1:

r=-.25).

But if Dynes, Quarantelli, and Kreps

(1972) are right, at some point in the process of organizing, preparedness
should enhance flexibility for dealing with unanticipated circumstances.
Participants in self-contained responses (PINT) have fewer opportunities
to redefine the basis of appropriate behavior as a result of influences
from the broader social environment.

Thus, they are more likely to

respond on the basis of established practices.

Finally, the ratio of

disaster impacts to remaining resources tends to be lower in larger
communities (COMM).

Thus, routines are less severely disrupted and

responses are more likely to take place with reference to them.
The correlation findings also point clearly to the dynamics of
role-making at stage 1 of origins.

For example, there is an interesting

relationship between the dynamics of role and the presence and timing of
task related contingencies.

As noted on Table 7, the greater the evidence

of task contingencies at the origins of organization, the less the
evidence of role-playing (TCON:
evidence of role-making (TCON:

r=-.28 with R0LEM-P1), the greater the
r=.37 with R0LEM1), and the less the

evidence of mixed role-making and role-playing (TCON:
R0LEMIX1).

r=-.23 with

These correlations point to elemental attempts to improvise a

division of labor in the face of unusual demands and social disruptions.
A similar strain toward improvisation is evidenced when the task structure
specific to the response is more complex (RTSTR:
r=.29 with R0LEM1, and r=-.21 with R0LEP1);

r=-.28 with R0LEM-P1,

where the social networks of
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the enacting unit are emergent rather than established prior to the event
(ITLINKS:
R0LEP1);
(INLINKS:
R0LEP1).

r=-.40 with R0LEM-P1, r=.36 with R0LEM1, and r=-.34 with
and where the social networks of the enacting unit are larger
r=-.37 with R0LEM-P1, r=.26 with ROLEMl, and r=-.39 with
All of these findings again point to the creation of social

structure in response to (1) severe demands of a nonroutine event and
(2) more complex circumstances of collective action.
The remaining three findings on Table 7 are perhaps more subtle but
equally interesting.

Note that there is less role-playing in communities

with greater degrees of disaster experience (C-EXP:
and r=-.25 with R0LEP1).

r=-.22 with R0LEM-P1

Although not reported on Table 7, greater

experience is also positively related with role-making (C-EXP:
R0LEM1).

r=.14 with

Moreover, communities with more experience tend to have more

severe events, as measured by magnitude and scope of impact (C-EXP with
EVENT-MS:

r=.31).

It appears that while disaster preparedness increases

clarity about what is to be done., disaster experience serves as a tacit
cultural resource which enhances flexibility.

There is no question that

both clarity and flexibility are needed during disaster.
Note also that there is more role-making when the period of
forewarning is longer (EVENTTP:

r=.22 with R0LEM1).

This suggests that,

with the luxury of time, there is greater opportunity for restructuring to
meet unusual demands.

Perhaps when time is scarce the threatened

communities respond, at least initially, in terms of routine practices.
This same pattern may account for the intriguing relationship between role
and the remaining temporal variable, INTIME.

Specifically, the greater

the gap (in hours) between the establishment of the first element of
organization and the time of impact of the disaster, the less the mix of
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role-making and role-playing (INTIME:

r=-.26 with R0LEMIX1);

and

although not reported on Table 7 (below the .10 inclusion criterion),
INTIME is positively correlated with role-making (r=.19 with R0LEM1).

I

conclude that time serves as an opportunity structure for redefining
appropriate behavior to deal with unusual and difficult circumstances.
There is no question that much has been made above about largely low
to moderate bivariate correlations.

I think this is justified within an

exploratory attempt to unravel often subtle processes of organizing.

To

further reduce the data to a few key findings, multiple stepwise
regressions have been computed for each of the four stages of origins.

As

noted above, discriminant analysis has also been completed and, in all
cases, replicates regression findings.

At this first stage of origins,

then, R0LEM-P1, R0LEM1, R0LEMIX1, and R0LEP1 have been regressed
separately with the set of exogenous variables listed on Table 7.

Using a

.10 inclusion criterion for adding variables to equations, ELSTAGE1 is the
only variable which makes the equation for R0LEM-P1 (BETA=.65, R^=.42)
and R0LEM1 (BETA=-.71, R^=.50).

No variable is statistically

significant at the .10 level for R0LEMIX1.
reported on Table 8.

The equation for R0LEP1 is

There ELSTAGE1 is again the key variable (BETA=.40)

with PLANN (BETA=.29) also showing a positive relationship with
role-playing.

A key implication can be strongly stated.

Where the first

element at origins is a collectively represented end of organization (T or
D), there is a substantial degree of role-playing associated with its
enactment.

In such instances pre-disaster routines are, in effect,

guiding disaster related actions.

Formal disaster preparedness sometimes

becomes a part of these routines.

At least at this first stage of

origins, one consequence is enhanced clarity about what is happening.
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TABLE 8:

Findings:
First Element Stage

Regression

Dependent Variables
ROLEPI

Independent Variables

Sig.

Beta

ELSTAGE1

.406

.403

.008

PLANN

.287

.294

.056

CONSTANT

-.203

R

R

.279

BREAKDOWN
ELSTAGE1

.199

PLANN

.081
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b.

Stage 2 of Origins: Two Elements of Organization Present
As indicated on Table 9, stage 1 role measures Lecome independent

variables with respect to all later stages of origins (2, 3, and 4
elements enacted).

The dependent variables at stage 2 are R0LEM-P2

(continuum measure), R0LEMIX2 (mix role-making and role-playing dummied
out), and R0LEP2 (role-playing dummied out).

You will note that each of

these dependent variables shows substantial associations with all stage 1
role measures except R0LEMIX1 (mix role-making and role-playing).

The

latter variable does not make the .10 significance criterion and its
bivariate correlations are therefore not included on Table 9.

The

findings involving R0LEM-P1 and R0LEP1 with R0LEM-P2 and R0LEP2 (R0LEM-P1:
r=.72 with R0LEM-P2 and .71 with ROLEP2 and R0LEP1:

r=.63 with R0LEM-P2

and .66 with R0LEP2) suggests that role-playing at stage 1 continues and,
as noted in the marginals, expands at stage 2.

While there is

substantially less role-making by stage 2, the findings involving R0LEM1
with R0LEM-P2 and ROLEP2 (R0LEM1:

r=-.63 with R0LEM-P2 and -.59 with

R0LEP2) suggest also that role-making at stage 1 contributes to its
counterpart at stage 2.

Interestingly enough, while role-playing at stage

1 is negatively related to mix role-making and role-playing at stage 2
(ROLEM-P1:

r=-.58 with R0LEMIX2, R0LEP1:

r=-.58 with R0LEMIX2),

role-making shows a positive association (R0LEM1:

r=.43 with R0LEMIX2).

Perhaps three processes are being revealed by these findings:

(1) the

autonomy of order through role-playing, (2) the autonomy of action through
role-making, and (3) the unity of both through mix role-making and
role-playing.

At stage 2 the forces of order appear to constrain the

latter process while the forces of action seem to augment it.
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TABLE 9: Correlation Analysis:
Role-Making— Role-Playing Dynamics at Stage 2
Origins of Organization

Dependent Variables

Independent
Variables
R0LEM-P2 SIG.
(Continuum)

R0LEMIX2 SIG.
(Mix)

ROLEP2
SIG.
(Role-Playing)

ELSTAGE1

.40

.006

-.25

.067

.36

.013

R0LEM-P1

.72

.000

-.58

.000

.71

.000

ROLEM1

-.63

.000

.43

.003

-.59

.000

ROLEP1

.63

.000

-.58

.000

.66

.000

-.30

.032

.26

.056

-.24

.070

DCON
TCON

-.28

.045

RTSTR

-.22

.091

.23

.080

ITLINKS

-.49

.001

VLOSS

-.32

.027

PINT

.27

.051

-.26

.054

.36

.014

-.47

.002

-.29

.037
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Notice that ELSTAGE1 (presence of T or D as first element established
at origins) continues to show positive but less powerful correlations with
role-playing (ELSTAGE1:

r = .40 with R0LEM-P2 and r=.36 with R0LEP2).

Thus, the impact of predisaster routines remain important but attenuates
as the organizing process unfolds.

It could be these routines become less

relevant as the unique demands of the situation call for new forms of
social action.

The now negative correlation with mix role-making and

role-playing (ELSTAGE1:

r=-.25), however, implies a tension between such

attempts to innovate and routine practices.

While the presence of formal

disaster preparedness (PLANN) and occurrence of the response in a
metropolitan community no longer show positive correlations with
role-playing, this pattern continues for responses that are largely
self-contained at origins (PINT:

r=.23 with R0LEM-P2).

of the latter finding remains unchanged.

My interpretation

That is, participants in

self-contained responses have fewer opportunities to redefine appropriate
behavior as a result of influences from the broader social environment.
This enhances predictability but perhaps at a cost in flexibility.
There is substantial consistency of role-making findings from stage 1
to stage 2.

Specifically, task contingencies at origins continue to be

inversely related with role-playing at stage 2 (TCON:
R0LEM-P2 and r=-.24 with R0LEP2).

r=-.28 with

Moreover, the same inverse relationship

continues to hold for more complex task structures (RTSTR, r=-.22 with
R0LEM-P2 and r=-.26 with R0LEP2) and when the social network of the
response is emergent rather than established prior to the event (ITLINKS:
r=-.49 with R0LEM-P2 and r=-.47 with R0LEP2).

While the number of links

(INLINKS) is no longer related to role measures, the direction of its
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relationships are consistent with stage 1 findings (e.g.
R0LEM-P2).

r=-.16 with

Once again, these findings point to elemental attempts to

improvise a division of labor under complex and demanding circumstances.
Of considerable interest as well, responses with more complex task
structures and emergent social networks now show positive relationships
with mix role-making and role-playing (RTSTR:
ITLINKS:

r=.36 with R0LEMIX2).

r=.27 with R0LEMIX2 and

These combined findings imply the

beginnings of a more facilitating mix of the old and the new as the
response unfolds.

What Kreps earlier referred to, from Weber, as the

useful blending of administrative and substantive rationality seems to be
operating at stage 2 of origins.
Finally, two new variables come into play at stage 2:

VLOSS or

evidence of empathy toward victims in the communications of direct
participants and DCON or the presence of a domain contingency at origins.
The former is inversely related with role-playing (VLOSS:
R0LEM-P2 r=-.29 with R0LEP2).

r=-.32 with

The latter is inversely related with a mix

of role-making and role-playing (DCON:

r=-.30 with R0LEMIX2) and

positively related with role-playing (DCON:

r=.26).

The measure of

empathy (VLOSS) recalls Durkheim's discussion of the moral order.

The

disaster disrupts the rational (instrumental) character of social routines
(organic solidarity) and reveals their elemental grounding in the
nonrational (normative) social bond (mechanical solidarity).

The results

are innovative attempts at organized altruism that is consistent with, in
the Weberian sense, ultimate values.

The presence of domain contingencies

at origins (DCON) sugggests that internal or external expectations of
appropriate spheres of action are being questioned by direct participants
or those outside the response.

In either case, it is likely that internal
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and external expectations of what is to be done do not parallel one
another.

With respect to the enacting unit, what may be in evidence here

is the tension between organization as closed versus open system.

The

inverse correlation between DCON and mix role-making and role-playing
implies, perhaps, that by stage 2 the enacting unit is accommodating this
tension on its own terms.
Just as with stage 1, stepwise regression equations were computed to
isolate the most powerful independent variables.

Separate equations were

run for R0LEM-P1, R0LEM1, and R0LEP1 because of the substantial
multicollinearity among them.

And to repeat, regressions were not run

with R0LEMIX1 as an independent variable because it dropped out at the
bivariate level.

Tables 10, 11, and 12 show a consistent pattern of

unique effects for the separate measures of role (R0LEM-P1, ROLEMl,
R0LEP1), emergent social networks (ITLINKS), empathy for victims (VLOSS),
and task (TCON) or domain (DCON) contingencies at origins.

As highlighted

in the discussion of bivariate correlations, role-playing and role-making
dynamics show considerable continuity from stage 1 to stage 2;

emergent

networks, task contingencies at origins, and empathy for victims are
implicated by the dynamics of role-making;

and domain contingencies at

origins (albeit less specifically than the correlations) suggest a closed
system strain operating with respect to the enacting unit,
c.

Stage 3 of Origins:

Three Elements of Organization Present

As noted in the discussion of the marginals, role-playing
predominates by stage 3 of origins.

To repeat, however, such role-playing

is specific to the response and not necessarily tied to pre-disaster
routines (in the case of role criteria 1 and 3).

Because of the

predominance of role-playing, only it (R0LEP3) is dummied out against
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TABLE 10:

Regression Findings:
Second Element Stage

Dependent Variables
Independent
Variables

R0LEM-P2
Beta

b

ROLEMIX2
Sig.

Beta

-.550

R0LEP2

lb

Sig.

Beta

b

-.323

.000

.604

.361

.000

Sig.

ROLEM-P1

.593

.425

.000

VLOSS

.220

-.269

.050

-.198

-.201

.083

ITLINKS

.236

-.283

.051

-.213

-.213

.084

DCON

CONSTANT

-.232

-.137

.091

1.884

1.317

.001

.610

.389

.589

ROLEM-P1

.513

.337

.510

VLOSS

.050

.041

ITLINKS

.047

.038

R2

I2

BREAKDOWN

DCON

.053
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TABLE 11:

Regression Findings:
Second Element Stage

Dependent Variables
Independent
Variables

ROLEM-P2
Beta

R0LEMIX2

_b

Sig.

ROLEMl

-.493

-.647

.001

ITLINKS

-.295

-.353

.026

VLOSS

-.215

-.262

.082

DCON

CONSTANT

Beta

.402

-.253

b

.433

-.150

R0LEP2
Sig.

Beta

.010

b

Sig.

-.488

-.535

.001

-.293

-.293

.040

.095

3.004

.526

.838

.524

.252

.426

ROLEM1

.400

.189

.351

ITLINKS

.078

VLOSS

.045

R2

I2

BREAKDOWN

DCON

.075

.063
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TABLE 12:

Regression Findings:
Second Element Stage

Dependent Variables
Independent
Variables

ROLEM-P2
Beta

b

R0LEMIX2
Sig.

Beta

-.554

ROLEP2

b

Sig.

Beta

b

-.548

.000

.554

.558

.000

Sig.

ROLEP1

.483

.583

.000

ITLINKS

.278

-.333

.027

-.262

-.262

.038

VLOSS

.278

-.340

.020

-.232

-.236

.051

TCON

.206

-.141

.081

DCON

CONSTANT

-.246

-.146

.071

2.857

.875

.578

.584

.396

.556

ROLEP1

.392

.336

.436

ITLINKS

.086

.068

VLOSS

.065

.053

TCON

.041

R2

R2

BREAKDOWN

DCON

.060
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everything else (mostly mix role-making and role-playing) to serve as the
single measure of role at stage 3 (R0LEP3).

As in stage 2, role measures

at the immediately preceding stage (R0LEM-P2, R0LEMIX2, and R0LEP2) now
become independent variables.

While this simplifies the presentation of

findings, it should be noted that role measures at stage 1 and stage 2
show largely consistent patterns with R0LEP3 (see Appendix 2).
As indicated in Table 13, the continuity of role-playing from stage 1
to 2 continues, albeit less powerfully from stage 2 to 3 (R0LEM-P2:
with R0LEP3 and R0LEP2:

r=.48 with R0LEP3).

r=.49

The inverse relationship

between mix role-making and role-playing at stage 2 and role-playing at
stage 3 (R0LEMIX2:

r=-.38) points again to autonomous action and the

continuing need for innovative behavior in the circumstance of disaster.
Certainly role-making is no longer independent of role-playing.

But

perhaps there remains a necessary coexistence of clarity on the one hand
and improvisation on the other.

ELSTAGE1 is again positively correlated

with role-playing (r=.26), but note that the relationship has become
increasingly less pronounced with each additional element.

The finding

lends further support for the conclusion drawn at stage 2:

namely that

predisaster routines become enmeshed with new forms of social action as
the impacted community responds to the unique demands of the emergency.
Several variables, some of which earlier suggested the dynamics of
role-making, point to the same at stage 3.
(TCON:

Task contingencies at origins

r=-.27 with R0LEP3), activities contingencies at origins (ACON:

r=-.33), more forewarning (EVENTTP:

r=-.23 with R0LEP3), and greater time

between impact and establisment of the first element (INTIME:
inversely related with role-playing.

r=-.38) are

These findings suggest that there is
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TABLE 13: Correlation Analysis:
Role-Making— Role-Playing Dynamics at Stage 3
Origins of Organization

Dependent Variable
Independent
Variables
ROLEM-P3
(Continuum)
EVENTTP

SIG.

-.23

.080

ELSTAGE1

.26

.054

ROLEM-P2

.49

.001

R0LEMIX2

-.38

.010

.48

.001

TCON

-.27

.049

AC ON

-.33

.022

PLANN

-.22

.094

SIZ

.39

.007

COMM

.22

.094

-.38

.009

ROLEP2

INTIME
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a continuing need to improvise a division of labor as organization is
enacted (TCON and ACON).

Time (EVENTTP and INTIME) should be seen as a

scarce resource for so doing.

Notice also the negative correlation

between formal preparedness and role-playing (PLANN:

r=-.22).

Recall

that at stage 1 preparedness had been positively related with
role-playing.

Now the relationship has been reversed.

supports the idea that preparedness has dual value.
clarity about what to do early in the response.

This finding

First, it increases

Second, it is a resource

for flexibility and improvisation as the response unfolds.

Although not

grounded in the nomenclature of role, this is precisely the argument made
in an earlier planning monograph by Dynes, Quarantelli, and Kreps (1972).
In Weberian terras, the planning effort may support the requirements of
both administrative and substantive rationality.
The two remaining variables— responses enacted in metropolitan
communities (COMM) and size of the enacting unit (SIZ) show positive
relationships with role-playing (COMM:
with R0LEP3).

r=.22 with R0LEP3 and SIZ:

r=.39

Recall that COMM showed a similar pattern at stage 1.

My

interpretation there was that disasters are less disruptive of ongoing
routines in metropolitan communities (lower impact ratios) and, therefore,
responses were more likely to take place with reference to these routines.
My interpretation remains unchanged for stage 3.

The more focused size

variable (SIZ) suggests that the greater the number of participants, the
greater the need for predictability about what they are doing as the
enactment of organization comes closer to fruition.
of Weber"s notion of formal rationality.

Such is the dictate
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Tables 14, 15, and 16 summarize stepwise multiple regression
equations, with R0LEM-P2, R0LEMIX2, and R0LEP2 run in separate equations
to reduce problems of multicolinearity.

The various role measures along

with SIZ, INTIME, and PLANN fall out in quite consistent fashion as
important variables in the equations.

While role measures remain

powerful— and indeed they should— notice the increased relative power of
remaining variables as organization comes closer to enactment.

This

suggests that any analysis of role dynamics of organization must reference
other variables of the enacting unit as well as broader physical,
temporal, and social variables of the disaster setting.
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TABLE 14:

Regression Findings:
Third Element Stage

Dependent Variables
Independent Variables

ROLEM-P3
Sig.

Beta

ROLEM-P2

.548

.460

.000

SIZ

.316

.148

.007

INTIME

.398

-.192

.001

PLANN

.228

-.236

.062

ACON

.220

-.124

.083

CONSTANT

1.992

R

R2

.664

BREAKDOWN
ROLEM-P2

.236

SIZ

.172

INTIME

.122

PLANN

.100

ACON

.034
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TABLE 15:

Regression Findings:
Third Element Stage

Dependent Variables
R0LEM-P3

Independent Variables

Sig.

Beta

SIZ

.389

.182

.003

R0LEMIX2

.428

.438

.001

INTIME

.390

.188

.003

PLANN

.248

.257

.049

CONSTANT

2.976

R

.517

BREAKDOWN
SIZ

.156

ROLEMIX2

.163

INTIME

.137

PLANN

.061
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TABLE 16:

Regression Findings:
Third Element Stage

Dependent Variables
Independent Variables

ROLEM-P3
Beta

ROLEP2

.540

.543

.000

SIZ

.389

.182

.001

INTIME

.382

.184

.001

PLANN

.298

.308

.010

CONSTANT

2.563

R

R

Sig.

.621

BREAKDOWN
ROLEP2

,227

SIZ

,179

INTIME

129

PLANN
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CONCLUSION

Kreps" substantive theory of organization provides a useful basis for
comparing Durkheim and Weber with reference to action, order and the
concept of role.

In the taxonomy of forms of association Kreps (1985)

captures the paradox of structure from either order or action sides.
order is referenced, the paradox is nicely expressed by Durkheim.

When

When

action is referenced, the paradox is revealed most pointedly by Weber.

In

either case, I suggest that Kreps" notion of organization as process
implicates still another venerable concept of sociology— that of role— in
a very direct way.

Specifically, the dynamics of role-playing and

role-making distinguish between structure as Durkheimian force and
Weberian social construction.
I argue that the tension or balancing of the forces of action and
order can be uncovered through an analysis of role for the six midpoint
forms in Kreps" action-order metric.

Four criteria are used to

distinguish between role-making, mix role-making and role-playing, and
role-playing at the four stages of origins (1, 2, 3, and 4 elements
present) of these midpoint forms.

Marginal distributions of role

variables point to an increase in role-playing as each additional element
of organization is enacted.

However, the progressive character of

role-playing is grounded, in no small way, by emergent improvisations.
Such improvisations are the stuff of role-making.
Role is analyzed, first, on its own terms and, second, as it relates
to physical, social, and temporal characteristics of the response and
emergency.

Whether it be domain, task, and activities contingencies at
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origins of organization, the timing of origins relative to impact,
participant empathy for victims, the size and preparedness of the enacting
unit, the complexity of the unit's social network or the material and
cultural resources of the impacted community, the correlation and
regression analyses show that role must be unraveled as but one part of a
broader structural drama.

I conclude that the structural drama of

disaster informs even as it is anticipated by the respective theories of
Durkheim and Weber.
The statistical analyses summarily show both the uniqueness of
role-playing and role-making and how they mutually reinforce one another
as organization unfolds.

When the first element of organization is

enacted, their uniqueness is perhaps most sharply demarcated.

The unusual

and severe circumstances of a disaster disrupts social routines and
requires new definitions of appropriate behavior.

Such attempts to

improvise are associated with task contingencies, a more complex division
of labor, greater disaster experience in the impacted community, larger or
emergent social networks, and greater length of forewarning.

However,

such improvisations do not preclude early reliance of community routines.
Even as structure is being created to meet the unique demands of disaster,
much role-playing is being evidenced as external force which molds the
actions of participants.

This is especially apparent when the first

element of organization is domain or tasks, when the response is
self-contained rather than boundary spanning, when there has been formal
disaster preparedness, and when the broader community has ample resources
with which to respond.
Role-playing expectedly increases just as role-making continues with

87

the unfolding of organization at stages 2, 3, and 4.

The viable mixing of

Weberian social construction and Durkheimian normative force is,
therefore, part
setting.

and parcel to the creation of organization in the disaster

Stated another way,

the paradox of action and order is revealed

by the unity of action and order as organization.

Most of the key

independent variables at stage 1 continue to operate at subsequent stages
and new variables come into play.

Most notable of the latter are empathy

for victims and

the timing of the response as each relates to role-making;

and the size of

theenacting unit as it relates to role-playing.

The dynamics of action, order, and role have thus far been considered
only as a matter of theory.

I also think the findings have important

implications for disaster preparedness.

Each the 38 cases examined in the

study was successful in the sense that, in the face of unusual demands,
organization was achieved.

In recognition of that, Kreps (1985, ch.6)

earlier offered several principles of emergency management based on
findings from the total sample of 423 cases and an earlier monograph on
disaster planning by Dynes, Quarantelli, and Kreps (1972).

The results of

the present role analysis supports and extends much of Kreps' reasoning.
Blending further theoretical efforts in this thesis with practical
problems of responding to disaster, my final remarks extend Kreps'
discussion of management principles.
As reported in Kreps (1985), Table 17 juxtaposes popular images of
disaster with more realistic implications derived from historical
research.

In what follows I will first relate the present findings to the

principles listed on the right hand column of Table 17.

Then I will

discuss several of the remaining principles that Kreps develops from his
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TABLE 17:
Popular Image Versus More
Realistic Implications for Planning
Realistic Implication

Popular Image
1.

People when faced with a great
danger will panic.
Accordingly,
warnings should be withheld
until the last minute.

1.

Information about dangers
should be disseminated and not
withheld because of a fear that
people will panic.

2.

Those who do not act irra
tionally are often unmobilized
by major emergencies.
They will
need help to perform basic
social functions.

2.

It should be assumed that persons
in disaster-impacted areas
actively respond to the emergency
and will not wait for communtiy
officials to tell them what to do.

Partly because of widespread
individual pathological reactions
and partly because of the over
whelming damage to the resources
of disaster-affected communities,
the ability of local social units
to perform effectively m handling
emergency tasks is severely limited.
Outside help will be essential.

3.

The ratio of disaster damages to
remaining community and regional
resources most often is low to
modest. Local social units
generally have enough people and
are not rendered ineffective by
loss of personnel. Outside aid
should be consistent with
local requirements and not sent
indiscriminantly•

The social disorganziation of the
communtiy, which is a product of
disaster impact, provides the
conditions tor the surfacing of
anti-social behavior.
Since social
control is weak or absent, deviant
behavior emerges and the dazed
victims m the disaster area become
easy victims for looting and other
forms of criminal
activity.

4.

While symbolic security
measures have to be taken,
massive deployment of security
forces is unnecessary.
Looting
and other anti-social behaviors
are rare in disaster situations.

4

.

Community morale is generally
high immediately after a disaster.
Quick restoration of essential
community services will tend
to sustain it.

Community morale is very low in
disaster stricken areas.
Steps
must be taken to overcome demoral
ization of the impacted population.

6.

A descent into total personal
and social chaos is possible in
communities impacted by major
disasters.
Immediate, firm, and
unequivocal leadership is
required.
Often this leadership
must come from the outside.

6.

Communities mobilize rapidly to
meet disaster demands even under
circumstances that are quite
severe. Timely coordination
is more important than leadership.
While often difficult to
achieve, coordination is essential
and should be maintained under
local control.
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own study and show how they can be enhanced by use of the role concept.
With respect to statement 1 on Table 17, panic is not the problem.
Instead, the need is to increase the possibility of informed evacuation
decisions.

The argument made is that information about threats should be

issued early, general warnings relayed in terms of personal probabilities,
and specific suggestions offered about what to do.

Of course time is

always of the essence, but findings from the present research support the
argument for early dissemination of warnings.

Recall that restructuring

to meet unique demands is enhanced with greater length of forewarning.

In

the case of warning and evacuation, given timely information people will
adapt routines to meet the requirements of the impending threat.
The second statement on Table 17 is supported by findings for
role-making, mix role-making and role-playing, and role-playing.

The

general thrust of organizing to meet disaster demands is the meshing of
established and emergent structure.

Thus, existent practices are not torn

asunder and victims rendered helpless by the event.

Even with more severe

disasters there is considerable continuity between pre-disaster routines
and post-disaster actions.

People are guided by extant role obligations

and, at the same time, highly adaptive to altered circumstances.
dynamics of role is evidence of both.

The

Interestingly, the findings about

domain contingencies suggests that there may be disagreements between
community officials and direct participants about appropriate action.
Kreps suggests, the process may not always be rigidly controlled, but
things get done.
The emphasis with the third statement is the importance of the
relationship between disaster impacts and remaining local resources.

As

90

Often there is considerable wherewithal with which to respond.

The

positive relationship between role-playing and community size is apropos
of this point.

Thus, the resources of, in particular, larger metropolitan

areas should be borne in mind in considering the kinds and timing of
outside assistance.
With respect to statement 4, the importance of pre-disaster routines
and the considerable role-playing which takes place point to the
continuing importance of social control when disaster strikes.

And while

the present research does not examine criminality in any way, it does show
that empathy for victims contributes to organized altruism.

In sum, there

is little evidence of disorganization and normative breakdown,
considerable evidence of prosocial action, and as suggested by statement
5, community morale remains high.
adaptiveness of any social system.

There are, of course, limits to the
While little is known about them, it

is clear that most disasters do not overwhelm the capacities of impacted
communities.
As indicated by statement 6, communities mobilize rapidly to meet
disaster demands even under circumstances that are quite severe.

The

present study suggests that emergencies call for role-making as part and
parcel to maintaining the viability of the community.

Perhaps the most

interesting example of this point are the findings for formal
preparedness.

Preparedness increases role-playing early in the enactment

of organization, serving as a source of continuity by defining expected
actions.

But as the enactment unfolds preparedness becomes a resource for

improvisation through role-making.

This is the goal Dynes, Quarantelli,

and Kreps had in mind when they argued that planning should be flexible
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and continuous rather formal and episodic.
The remaining management principles discussed by Kreps are based on
the total sample of 423 cases, but absent of direct evidence on
role-making and role-playing.

Each relevant principle is listed and this

is followed by a discussion of how the present study informs it.
Organization can

be distinguished from other types of social

structure by the

co-presence of domains (D), tasks (T), human

and material resources (R), and activities (A).

Knowing the

difference between organization and other things social is the
theoretical foundation of emergency management.
While organization is something which can be sought and achieved by
those involved in emergency management, hazards managers must distinguish
between it and other forms of human association.
thatwhat might appear as confusion,
and necessary process

of adjustment.

at every stage of origins.

The findings suggest

or worse, is really a quite natural
Role-making exists to some degree,

Not to be feared as disorder, it is better

seen as order blending with action.

Stated theoretically, the data

suggest that improvisation reveals the autonomy and unity that is social
structure.

In Durkheim's words, structure is always there yet constantly

becoming and changing.

If "attainment of organization is a relevant

management objective" (Kreps, 1985, p.217), it is critical for hazards
managers to have a conception of organization that is appropriate to the
emergency setting.

The argument here is that the subtleties of

organization are best revealed by treating it as developing process.
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There are alternative but not an unlimited number of paths to
the attainment of organization following disasters.

Hazards

managers should assume that all 24 patterns of origins
represented in the theory are possible and, depending on the
characteristics of impacts, each may be appropriate and
effective.
Only 6 of the 24 possible organizational forms (as defined by Kreps)
are examined in this thesis.
forces of action and order.

These 6 forms represent a balancing of the
Thus all of the 38 cases are instances of

organization, yet none is biased toward action or order as Kreps defines
his metric.

This does not mean that they are any more or less effective

than the remaining 18 four element forms.

But they make clear Kreps'

point that organizing in disaster is not a chaotic process that needs to
be or, indeed, can be rigidly controlled.

What is evidenced as

role-making is not necessarily counterproductive and more likely reflects
a necessary adaptiveness.
earlier conclusion:

The findings of the present work support Kreps'

things do not just happen.

disaster is patterned responses.

What evolves during a

No one pattern is universally more

appropriate and each is a viable form of organization.

The patterns are

different in important ways and, in some sense, each instance of a pattern
is unique.

Yet all instances share a distinctiveness as organization.

While the enactment of organization should not (and probably
cannot) be forced into any particular pattern, disaster
preparedness increases the chance that (1) domains and tasks
will be more clearly defined and (2) immediate demands of the
emergency period will be addressed in more timely fashion.

The
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proper role of preparedness is to augment natural processes of
organizing without unnecessarily distorting what takes place.
As indicated in the present work,
enhances role-playing.
organizing process.

disaster preparedness initially

Social expectations guide behavior early in the

This supports Kreps' argument that "the necessarily

modest but important contribution of disaster preparedness is clarity in
the organizing process" (1985, p.223).

However, planning and training

need not be equated with rigid control.

Rather,

the findings show that as

a response evolves formal preparedness becomes associated with
improvisation m

the form of role-making.

tandem with ongoing role-playing.

Not isolated role-making but in

The implication I draw is that flexible

preparedness serves to tailor responses to the unique demands of the
situation.

The contribution of

notion of clarity by augmenting

planning then,

extends beyond Kreps'

the processes of organizing. The

rise and

fall of particular instances of organization is not the key
concern of emergency management at community, regional,
national

levels of response.

or

The more important objective at

these levels is coordination of networks of responding social
units.

An appropriate emergency management role is to

facilitate coordination by

being a source or conduit of

information about hazards,

what is needed, and what is

available.
The relevance of social networks is clearly evidenced by the findings
from the present study.
role-playing.

Self-contained responses enhance clarity through

Those enacting units operating in more complex networks

show greater evidence of some strain toward role-making.

Improvisation in
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the absence ol a facilitating communications network smacks of confusion.
The information conduit role that Kreps argues for hazards management is
in accord with the historical concept of coordination in that field.
Emergent networks themselves are a particularly

important indication of

role-making and, as Kreps shows, are a part of the organizing process.
Hazards managers must be cognizant of and sensitive to these usually
short-lived but critically

important instances of structure, most of which

are non-organizationai forms of association.

Emergency management can

facilitate these networks by providing information about what is needed
and what is available.
Efficient and effective emergency management requires equal
attention to organizational and non-organizational
association in disaster.

forms of

The achievement of organization must

be seen as part of a broader strategy of facilitating
coordination among and between networks of social units.
The present research concentrates only on selected types of
organizational forms of association in disaster.
as a process of origins.

Each form is interpreted

The results indicate that each progressive stage

of origins is influenced by earlier stages, but also unique with respect
to each new element added.

Regardless of whether organization is

ultimately achieved or not,

the findings suggest that nonorganizational

forms of 1, 2, or 3 elements present are relevant and important to the
community's overall emergency response.

Recall also the significant

impact of social networks on the process of organization.

The networks

can be described on their own terms as forms of association and each two
unit relationship within them can be as well

(Francis and Kreps, 1984).
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In either case,
Kreps'

links among discrete instances of organization implicate

elements of organization in various ways which can be described and

which imply varying degrees of coordination.

Coordination is an important

concept in emergency management circles but it lacks specificity.

Kreps'

and my findings suggest that it is best thought of as part of an
organizing process, not organization itelf.
To conclude, my research offers the concept of role as a key
dimension of social structure and disaster.

Specifically,

role analysis

has provided a fruitful way of examining action, order, and their unity
organization.

in

The paradox of social structure— i.e., the autonomy and

unity of action and order— is uniquely represented in classical sociology
by the works of Durkheim and Weber.
problem of order.

Durkheim expresses the paradox as a

Weber express it as a problem of action.

Their

respective insights on order and action remain central for contemporary
sociology.

Here they guide our understanding of role-making and

role-playing as two sides of the same coin.

Kreps'

interpretation of

action and order was built on the foundations of the classics.

The

present study suggests that his resulting theory of organization becomes
m o r e analytically powerful by exploiting the concept of role.
I hope,

is a clearer picture of what goes on in disaster.

The result,
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APPENDIX 1: Marginal Distributions of
Role-Making and Role-Playing Criteria

Element Stages
Totals

Criterion Scores
2

3

1

11

3

2

-

16

2

6

6

11

2

25

3

20

28

25

36

109

9

1

1

-

-

2

1

6

2

1

1

10

2

13

17

19

9

58

3

lb

18

17

27

80

9

1

1

1

1

4

1

14

4

-

-

18

2

5

9

14

-

28

3

19

24

24

38

105

9

-

1

-

-

1

1

-

2

-

-

2

2

11

4

8

8

31

3

23

29

28

30

110

9

4

3

2

-

9

152

152

152

152

Criterion 1

Criterion 2

Criterion 3

Criterion 4

Totals
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APPENDIX 2: Means, Standard Deviations
and Correlations of Model Variables

1
1.

ROL e I

2.

ROLElA

3.

ROLElB

4.

ROLE1C

5.

ROLE2

6.

ROLE2A

7.

ROLE2B

8.

R0LE3

9.

ROLE4

10.

DCON

11.

TCUN

12.

RCON

13.

ACON

14.

ELSTAGE1

15.

FOT

16.

SIZ

17 .

PLANN

lb.

RTSTR

19.

VLOSS

20.

CDMGE

MEAN
STD. DEV.

1.00

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

-.87

-.10

.89

.72

-.58

.71

.41

.11

.13

1.00

-.41

-.54

-.63

.43

-.59

-.52

-.18

-.13

1.00

-.54

-.05

.20

-.13

.29

.16

.01

1.00

.63

-.58

.66

.21

.02

.11

1.00

-.68

.93

.49

.21

.19

1.00

-.90

-.38

.11

-.30

1.00

.48

.72

.26

1.00

.25

.03

1.00

-.01

1.00

2.13
.84

.29
.46

.29
.46

.42
.50

2.50
.60

.39
.50

.55
.50

2.50
.50

11.42 1.71
.84
.86
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APPENDIX 2: Means, Standard Deviations
and Correlations of Model Variables Continued

11

12

-.29

16

13

14

15

-.01

.11

.65

.10

-.03

18

19

.27

-.28

-.13

17

20
.06

1.

ROLEl

2.

R0LE1A

.37

.01

-.13

-.71

-.14

-.02

-.13

.29

.16

-.11

3.

ROLEIB

-.23

.01

.06

.22

.09

.09

-.25

-.06

-.08

.13

4.

ROLElC

-.14

-.01

.06

.45

.04

-.06

.34

-.21

-.07

-.01

5.

ROLE 2

-.28

.03

.07

.40

.18

-.04

.18

-.22

-.32

.09

6.

ROLE2A

.16

.10

.08

-.25

-.01

.07

-.06

.27

.21

-.05

7.

ROLE2B

-.24

-.03

.01

.36

.11

-.06

.14

-.26

-.29

.08

8.

R0LE3

-.27

.04

-.33

.26

.11

.39

-.22

-.16

-.05

.00

9.

R0LE4

-.26

-.01

-.03

-.05

-.03

.20

.01

.00

-.04

-.20

.12

-.05

.11

.20

-.05

-.08

.27

.03

.04

-.07

11.

TOON

1.00

.27

.02

-.31

.02

-.28

.14

.27

-.10

.11

12.

RCON

1.00

.35

.13

.31

-.25

.22

.04

.06

-.06

13.

ACUN

1.00

.19

.22

-.31

.46

-.03

0.01

.16

14.

EL STAG El

1.00

.22

-.11

.14

-.26

.03

-.03

15.

FOT

1.00

.08

.37

.00

.12

-.15

16.

SIZ

1.00

-.06

.10

.24

-.20

17.

PL ANN

1.00

.11

.06

-.10

18.

RTSTR

1.00

.05

.00

19.

VLOSS

1.00

-.51

CM

CDMGE

•

DCON

o

10.

MEAN
STD. DEV.

1.00

1.76
.88

1.45
.69

2.18
.90

.55
.50

.47
.50

2.58
1.08

1.37
.49

1.50
.51

.61
.50

.63
.50
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APPENDIX 2: Means, Standard Deviations
and Correlations of Model Variables Continued

21

23

.35

-.37

-.40

25

26

27

28

.06

-.07

-.18

-.03

-.17

.25

-.22

24

29

30

2.

R0LE1A

-.34

.26

.36

-.07

.19

.22

.06

.15

-.23

.14

3.

ROLElB

.03

.17

.01

.04

-.26

-.12

-.07

.00

.01

.14

4.

ROLElC

.28

-.39

-.34

.03

.06

-.10

.01

-.14

.21

-.25

3.

ROLE2

.23

-.16

-.49

.00

-.02

.06

.00

.06

.00

-.10

6.

R0LE2A

-.13

.14

.36

-.03

-.03

.04

.09

.11

.06

.17

7.

R0LE2B

.20

-.17

-.47

.02

.00

.02

-.04

-.02

-.03

-.14

8.

R0LE3

.17

-.04

-.16

.11

-.38

-.23

.11

.07

.22

.20

9.

R0LE4

.03

.04

-.01

-.11

-.14

.19

-.06

.08

-.33

.23

10.

DCON

.05

.09

-.20

-.15

.05

.10

.04

-.25

-.14

-.08

11.

TCON

-.31

.32

.12

-.14

.09

.12

.21

.03

-.02

.05

12.

RCON

-.07

.01

.11

-.01

-.23

-.09

-.U5

-.19

.02

-.01

13.

ACON

.04

.01

-.19

.24

-.13

.15

.01

-.28

-.03

-.09

14.

ELSTAGE1

.54

-.48

-.36

.02

-.25

-.29

-.04

-.29

.19

-.47

15.

FOT

.32

-.28

-.32

.37

-.32

-.10

-.04

.04

.40

-.03

16.

SIZ

.34

-.21

-.09

.04

-.05

-.17

-.06

.13

.21

.42

17.

PL ANN

.25

-.27

-.36

.01

-.07

.23

-.07

-.20

.24

-.07

18.

RTSTR

.06

.04

.16

-.11

.08

.18

.34

.20

.11

.20

19.

VLOSS

.24

-.22

.08

.14

.03

-.09

.15

-.11

.28

.16

CDMGE

-.14

.19

.03

.10

-.04

-.01

.19

.20

-.02

-.01

.34
.48

.82
.69

.45
.50

.42
.50

2.24
1.05

2.55
1.03

.68
.47

.82
.39

.63
.49

2.13
.66

•

ROLEl

CM

1.

o

22

MEAN
STD. DEV.
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21.

PINT

22.

INLINKS

23.

ITLINKS

24.

LOC

25.

INTIME

26.

EVENTTP

27.

EVENT-MS

28.

DOM-TP

29.

COMM

30.

C-EXP

MEAN
STD. DEV.

21

22

23

1.00

-.86

-.65

1.00

24

28

25

26

.17

-.22

-.12

.01

-.09

.32

-.06

.48

-.24

.17

.11

.15

.07

-.37

.11

1.00

-.12

.15

-.18

.16

.02

-.19

.06

1.00

-.19

.01

.24

.27

.21

.24

1.00

.30

-.23

.11

-.30

-.08

1.00

-.02

.12

-.34

.25

1.00

.26

.07

.31

27

29

1.00- .08
1.00

30

.41
.15
1.00

.34
.48

.82
.69

.45
.50

.42
.50

2.24
1.05

2.55
1.03

.68
.47

.82
.39

.63
.49

2.13
.66
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RESPONSE //
ELEMENT CODES:
Score indications:

1
2
3
9

-

ROLE-MAKING— ROLE-PLAYING CRITERIA

role-making dominates
mix role-making and role-playing
role-playing dominates
uncertain

Role boundary expansion versus unique role performance:
1-unique role performance, role-making dominates
2=mix of unique role performance and role boundary expansion
3=role boundary expansion, role-playing dominates
9=uncertain
ELI*

EL2=

EL3=

EL4=

Continuity versus discontinuity of pre- and post-impact
role relationships:
l=discontinuity of pre- and post-impact role
relationships, role-making dominates
2=mix of discontinuity and continuity of pre- and post
impact role relationships
3=continuity of pre- and post-impact role
relationships, role-playing dominates
ELI*

EL2=

EL3=

EL4=

Homogeneity versus heterogeneity of roles of key participants:
l=roles homogeneous, role-making dominates
2=roles heterogeneous with undefined task structure
3=roles heterogeneous with defined task structure,
role-playing dominates
9=uncertain
ELI*

EL2=

EL3=

EL4=

Consistency versus inconsistency of pre- and post
disaster status/role:
l=pre- and post-disaster status/role inconsistent,
role-making dominates
2=mix of inconsistent and consistent pre- and
post-disaster status/role
3=pre- and post-disaster status/role consistent,
role-playing dominates
9=uncertain
ELI*

EL2=

EL3=

EL4=
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ORGANIZATION,

ROLE, AND DISASTER

CODEBOOK

COLUMNS

ITEM

Organized disaster response number: RESPN

3

(1-3)

Event n u m b e r :

2

(4-5)

1

(6 )

Event
1
2
3
4

EVENT-MS

tvne:
EVENTTP
= earthquake
= tornado
= flood
= hurricane

Domain type: DOM-TP
2
(7-b)
1 = hazard-vulnerability analysis
2 - maintenance of standby human and material resources
3 = disaster preparedness, planning, and training
4 *= public education
5 = hazard mitigation-structural
6 = hazard mitigation-nonstructural
7 = insurance
8 « issuance of predictions and warnings
9 = dissemination of predictions and warnings
10 = evacuation
11 = mobilization of emergency personnel
12 = protective action
13 = search and rescue
14 = medical care
15 = providing v i ctim basic needs
(food, clothing, shelter)
16 - damage and needs assessments and inventory
of available resources
17 = damage control
lb = restoration of essential public services
19 = public information
20 = traffic control
21 = law enforcement
22 = local governance
23 = coordination and control (organization of
emergency personnel and resources)
24 = reconstruction of physical structures
25 = re-establishment of production, distribution,
and consumption activities (economic functioning)
26 = resumption ot other social institutions
2/ = determination of responsibility and legal
liability for the event
28 » reconstruction planning
29 = other
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Element presence at first stage of
organization: ELSTAGE1

1

(9)

1

(10)

Element presence at second stage of
organization:
ELSTAGE2
1 = DA
2 = TR
3 = RD
4 = RT
5 = AD
6 = TA

1

(11)

Composite action/order criteria score
at second stage: A/02

1

(12 )

Element presence at third stage of
organization: ELSTAGE3
1 = DAR
2 = TRA
3 = RDA
4 = RTD
5 = ADT
6 = TAD

1

(13)

Composite action/order criteria score
at third stage: A/03

1

(14)

1

(15)

1 = D
2 = T
3 = R
4 = A
Composite action/order criteria score
at tirst stage: A/01
Description:

Description:

Description:

Element presence at fourth stage of
organization: ELSTAGE4
1 = DART
2 = TRAD
3 = RDAT
4 = RTDA
5 = ADTR
6 = TADR

104

1

(16)

1

(17)

Domain definition problem at origins:
DCON
1 = no contingency present
2 = contingency present, onset at
maintenance of uncertain
3 = contingency present, onset at origins
9 = uncertain

1

(18)

Task definition problem: TASKPR
1 = absent
2 = present
9 = uncertain

1

(19)

Task definition problem at origins:
TCON
1 * no contingency present
2 = contingency present, onset at
maintenance of uncertain
3 = contingency present, onset at origins
9 = uncertain

1

(20)

Resource mobilization problem:
1 «* absent
2 = present
9 = uncertain

1

(21 )

Composite action/order criteria score
at tourth stage: A/04
1 = role-making dominates
2 = mix role-making and role-playing
3 = role-playing dominates
9 = uncertain
Description:

Domain definition problem: DOMPR
1 = absent
2 = present
9 = uncertain
Description:

Description:

Description:

RESPR

i(b

Resource mobilization problem at origins:
RCON
1 = no contingency present
2 = contingency present, onset at
maintenance of uncertain
3 = contingency present, onset at origins
9 = uncertain
Activity performance problem:
1 = absent
2 = present
9 = uncertain

1

ACTPR

(22)

1 (23)

Description:

Activity performance problem at origins:
ACON
1 * no contingency present
2 = contingency present, onset at
maintenance of uncertain
3 = contingency present, onset at origins
9 - uncertain
Type of
1 =
2 =
3 =
4 =
5 =
6 7 =

focal organization:
FOT
emergency relevant public bureaucracy
other public bureaucracy
emergency relevant voluntary agencies
special interest groups
private firms
emergent groups of individuals
emergent groups of other groups
and organizations
8 = military unit
9 = other

Response
1 =
2 =
9 =

task structure:
simple
complex
uncertain

RTSTR

1

(24)

1

(25)

1

(26)

Initiation of organized disaster response: PINT
1 (27)
1 = self contained
2 = boundary spanning local
3 = boundary spanning state
4 = boundary spanning national
5 = boundary spanning-mixed local and state
6 = boundary spanning-mixed local and national
7 = boundary spanning-mixed state and national
8 - boundary spanning-mixed local, state, and national
9 = uncertain
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If boundary spanning at intiation of
response links are:
ITLINKS
1 = established prior to disaster by planning
2 = emergent
3 = mixed established and emergent
4 = not applicable
9 = uncertain

1

(28)

Number of organizational
initiation: INLINKS
0 = none
1 = 1 - 3
2 = more than 3
3 = uncertain

1

(29)

links at

Evidence of pre-planning prior to response:
1 = no pre-planning
2 = pre-planning evidenced
9 = uncertain
Size of focal organization:
1 = 9 or fewer

PLANN 1

1

(31)

Community disaster experience in past
10 years:
C-EXP
1 = no disasters, few if any
threats
2 = no disasters, several threats
3 = one or more disasters
4 = one or more disasters and several threats
9 = uncertain

1

(32)

Community (rural-urban):
COMM
1 = rural area
2 = urban 10,000 or less
3 = urban 10,000 - 25,000
4 = urban 25,000 - 50,000
5 = urban metropolitan, 50,000+

1 (33)

Physical location relative to primary
impact area:
LOC
1 = close
2 = peripheral

1 (34)

Time of initiation:
INTIME
1 = 1 - 2 hours pre- or post-impact
2 = 3 - 24 hours pre- or post-impact
3 = 25 - 72 hours pre- or post-impact
4 = 72+ hours pre- or post-impact
9 = uncertain

1 (35)

2

=

10

-

SIZ

(30)

20

3 = 21 - 50
4 ■= over 50
9 = uncertain
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Factors drawn upon by participants to sustain communication
among participants and relevant others include • . .
Victim losses, emotional« structural,
material):
VLOSS
1 = no
2 = yes
9 ** uncertain

1

(36)

Overall community damage:
1 = no
2 = yes
9 = uncertain

1

(37)

CDMGE
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